Toru Hokari, Ph.D.
Affiliations: | 2000 | University of Rochester, Rochester, NY |
Area:
Theory EconomicsGoogle:
"Toru Hokari"Parents
Sign in to add mentor| William Thomson | grad student | 2000 | Rochester | |
| (Axiomatic analysis of TU coalitional games: Population monotonicity and consistency.) | ||||
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Publications
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| Hokari T, Funaki Y, Sudhölter P. (2020) Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games ∗ Review of Economic Design |
| Hokari T, Uchida S. (2017) On the existence of population-monotonic solutions on the domain of quasi-convex games Operations Research Letters. 45: 90-92 |
| Oishi T, Nakayama M, Hokari T, et al. (2016) Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations Journal of Mathematical Economics. 63: 44-53 |
| Hokari T, Thomson W. (2008) On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency Journal of Mathematical Economics. 44: 1057-1071 |
| Hokari T. (2005) Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games Games and Economic Behavior. 51: 63-82 |
| Hokari T, Kıbrıs Ö. (2003) Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games Mathematical Social Sciences. 45: 313-331 |
| Hokari T, Thomson W. (2003) Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule Economic Theory. 21: 241-261 |
| Hokari T, Gellekom Av. (2003) Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations International Journal of Game Theory. 31: 593-607 |
| Hokari T. (2002) Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games Social Choice and Welfare. 19: 825-844 |
| Hokari T. (2000) The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games International Journal of Game Theory. 29: 133-137 |