Alfred R. Mele
Affiliations: | Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States |
Area:
PhilosophyGoogle:
"Alfred Mele"Children
Sign in to add traineeJustin D. Barnard | grad student | 2002 | Florida State |
Thomas A. Nadelhoffer | grad student | 2005 | Florida State |
Charles M. Hermes | grad student | 2006 | Florida State |
Tracie L. Mahaffey | grad student | 2010 | Florida State |
Scott A. Mueller | grad student | 2010 | Florida State |
Justin A. Capes | grad student | 2011 | Florida State |
Christopher Zarpentine | grad student | 2011 | Florida State |
Joshua Shepherd | grad student | 2013 | Florida State |
Robyn R. Waller | grad student | 2014 | Florida State |
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Publications
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Mele AR. (2020) Direct Versus Indirect: Control, Moral Responsibility, and Free Action Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Mele AR. (2020) Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism Philosophical Studies. 177: 3143-3154 |
Mele AR. (2020) Self-deception and selectivity Philosophical Studies. 177: 1-15 |
Brass M, Furstenberg A, Mele AR. (2019) Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews |
Mele AR. (2019) Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 43: 75-92 |
Mele AR. (2019) On snubbing proximal intentions Philosophical Studies. 176: 2833-2853 |
Mele AR. (2018) Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism. Frontiers in Psychology. 9: 2536 |
Vonasch AJ, Baumeister RF, Mele AR. (2018) Ordinary people think free will is a lack of constraint, not the presence of a soul. Consciousness and Cognition. 60: 133-151 |
Mele AR. (2018) Diana and Ernie return: on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will Philosophical Studies. 175: 1525-1533 |
Mele AR. (2017) Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 80: 49-68 |