Maciej H. Kotowski, Ph.D. - Publications

Affiliations: 
2011 Economics University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States 

10 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Kotowski MH. First-price auctions with budget constraints Theoretical Economics. 15: 199-237. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3403297  0.44
2019 Balbuzanov I, Kotowski MH. Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange Econometrica. 87: 1663-1692. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2943015  0.307
2018 Kotowski MH. On asymmetric reserve prices Theoretical Economics. 13: 205-237. DOI: 10.3982/Te1824  0.41
2018 Kadam SV, Kotowski MH. Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets Games and Economic Behavior. 112: 1-20. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2018.07.005  0.377
2018 Kariv S, Kotowski MH, Leister CM. Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 565-581. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2018.02.004  0.424
2015 Kotowski MH, Weisbach DA, Zeckhauser RJ. Rules and standards when compliance costs are private information Journal of Legal Studies. 43: S297-S329. DOI: 10.1086/676883  0.334
2014 Kotowski MH, Weisbach DA, Zeckhauser RJ. Audits as signals University of Chicago Law Review. 81: 179-202. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2311417  0.332
2014 Kotowski MH, Li F. On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints Games and Economic Behavior. 85: 84-108. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2014.01.014  0.409
2014 Kotowski MH, Rachmilevitch S. Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum Games and Economic Behavior. 87: 616-618. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2013.03.008  0.352
2011 Kotowski MH. Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment Games and Economic Behavior. 72: 448-451. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2010.10.006  0.394
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