| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2020 |
Aridor G, Che Y, Salz T. The Economic Consequences of Data Privacy Regulation: Empirical Evidence from GDPR National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3522845 |
0.33 |
|
| 2019 |
Che Y, Kim J, Kojima F. Stable Matching in Large Economies Econometrica. 87: 65-110. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta13547 |
0.35 |
|
| 2019 |
Che Y, Mierendorff K. Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention The American Economic Review. 109: 2993-3029. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20171000 |
0.307 |
|
| 2018 |
Che Y, Tercieux O. Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets: Payoff equivalence in matching markets Theoretical Economics. 13: 239-271. DOI: 10.3982/Te2793 |
0.332 |
|
| 2018 |
Che Y, Condorelli D, Kim J. Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 178: 398-435. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2018.09.005 |
0.36 |
|
| 2017 |
Che Y, Severinov S. Disclosure and Legal Advice American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 9: 188-225. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.20140272 |
0.309 |
|
| 2017 |
Che Y, Choi S, Kim J. An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions Games and Economic Behavior. 102: 20-43. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2016.10.008 |
0.349 |
|
| 2016 |
Klionsky DJ, Abdelmohsen K, Abe A, Abedin MJ, Abeliovich H, Acevedo Arozena A, Adachi H, Adams CM, Adams PD, Adeli K, Adhihetty PJ, Adler SG, Agam G, Agarwal R, Aghi MK, ... Che Y, et al. Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (3rd edition). Autophagy. 12: 1-222. PMID 26799652 DOI: 10.1080/15548627.2015.1100356 |
0.368 |
|
| 2015 |
Che Y, Tercieux O. Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets Theoretical Economics. 13: 239-271. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2620566 |
0.379 |
|
| 2015 |
Che YK, Kim J, Kojima F. Efficient assignment with interdependent values Journal of Economic Theory. 158: 54-86. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.03.008 |
0.33 |
|
| 2014 |
Che Y, Sethi R. Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 6: 1-34. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.6.4.1 |
0.343 |
|
| 2013 |
Budish E, Che YK, Kojima F, Milgrom P. Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications American Economic Review. 103: 585-623. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.103.2.585 |
0.318 |
|
| 2013 |
Che YK, Gale I, Kim J. Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents Review of Economic Studies. 80: 73-107. DOI: 10.1093/Restud/Rds025 |
0.372 |
|
| 2013 |
Che YK, Gale I, Kim J. Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents International Journal of Industrial Organization. 31: 659-665. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ijindorg.2013.02.005 |
0.331 |
|
| 2010 |
Che Y, Kim J. Bidding with Securities: Comment The American Economic Review. 100: 1929-1935. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.100.4.1929 |
0.314 |
|
| 2009 |
Che YK, Kartik N. Opinions as incentives Journal of Political Economy. 117: 815-860. DOI: 10.1086/648432 |
0.319 |
|
| 2009 |
Che Y, Kim J. Optimal collusion-proof auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 565-603. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2008.07.004 |
0.331 |
|
| 2008 |
Che Y, Kojima F. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms Econometrica. 78: 1625-1672. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta8354 |
0.326 |
|
| 2008 |
Che Y, Spier KE. Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement: Divide and conquer Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 164: 4-23. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1009360 |
0.33 |
|
| 2008 |
Che YK. Products liability, signaling and disclosure Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 164: 127-129. DOI: 10.1628/093245608783742183 |
0.324 |
|
| 2008 |
Che Y, Spier KE. Strategic judgment proofing The Rand Journal of Economics. 39: 926-948. DOI: 10.1111/J.1756-2171.2008.00044.X |
0.344 |
|
| 2007 |
Che Y, Lewis TR. The role of lockups in takeover contests The Rand Journal of Economics. 38: 648-669. DOI: 10.1111/J.0741-6261.2007.00105.X |
0.329 |
|
| 2007 |
Andreoni J, Che YK, Kim J. Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment Games and Economic Behavior. 59: 240-259. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2006.09.003 |
0.314 |
|
| 2006 |
Che Y, Gale I. Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types Theoretical Economics. 1: 95-118. DOI: 10.7916/D8Qr58Bt |
0.33 |
|
| 2006 |
Che YK, Gale IL. Caps on political lobbying: Reply American Economic Review. 96: 1355-1360. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.96.4.1355 |
0.308 |
|
| 2006 |
Che Y, Kim J. Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation Econometrica. 74: 1063-1107. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00694.X |
0.326 |
|
| 2004 |
Burguet R, Che Y. Competitive Procurement with Corruption The Rand Journal of Economics. 35: 50-68. DOI: 10.2307/1593729 |
0.385 |
|
| 2004 |
Che Y, Sakovics J. A Dynamic Theory of Holdup Econometrica. 72: 1063-1103. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0262.2004.00526.X |
0.305 |
|
| 2004 |
Kim J, Che YK. Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions Games and Economic Behavior. 46: 383-397. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00126-X |
0.367 |
|
| 2003 |
Che YK, Gale I. Optimal design of research contests American Economic Review. 93: 646-671. DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157025 |
0.342 |
|
| 2002 |
Che YK. The economics of collective negotiation in pretrial bargaining International Economic Review. 43: 549-575. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.T01-1-00027 |
0.305 |
|
| 2001 |
Che Y, Yoo S. Optimal Incentives for Teams The American Economic Review. 91: 525-541. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.91.3.525 |
0.304 |
|
| 2000 |
Che YK, Gale I. The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer Journal of Economic Theory. 92: 198-233. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1999.2639 |
0.34 |
|
| 2000 |
Che YK. Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on de fraja (1999) Games and Economic Behavior. 33: 195-205. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1999.0782 |
0.314 |
|
| 2000 |
Che YK, Gale I. Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions Games and Economic Behavior. 30: 22-43. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1998.0709 |
0.313 |
|
| 1999 |
Che Y, Chung T. Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments The Rand Journal of Economics. 30: 84-105. DOI: 10.2307/2556047 |
0.345 |
|
| 1999 |
Che Y, Hausch DB. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting The American Economic Review. 89: 125-147. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.89.1.125 |
0.348 |
|
| 1999 |
Che Y, Schwartz A. Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 15: 441-467. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/15.2.441 |
0.332 |
|
| 1999 |
Che YK, Gale I. Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case European Economic Review. 43: 947-957. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00107-X |
0.331 |
|
| 1998 |
Che Y, Gale I. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders The Review of Economic Studies. 65: 1-21. DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00033 |
0.4 |
|
| 1997 |
Che Y, Gale I. Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 6: 175-200. DOI: 10.1111/J.1430-9134.1997.00175.X |
0.331 |
|
| 1996 |
Che Y. Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods Journal of Industrial Economics. 44: 17-24. DOI: 10.2307/2950557 |
0.308 |
|
| 1996 |
Che YK, Gale I. Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints Economics Letters. 50: 373-379. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0 |
0.37 |
|
| 1996 |
Che YK. Equilibrium formation of class action suits Journal of Public Economics. 62: 339-361. DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01546-9 |
0.308 |
|
| 1995 |
Che Y. Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion The Rand Journal of Economics. 26: 378-397. DOI: 10.2307/2555994 |
0.318 |
|
| 1994 |
Che YK. Buy-in through goldplating. The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination Economics Letters. 45: 397-405. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(94)90044-2 |
0.34 |
|
| 1993 |
Che Y. Design competition through multidimensional auctions The Rand Journal of Economics. 24: 668-680. DOI: 10.2307/2555752 |
0.328 |
|
| 1991 |
Polinsky AM, Che Y. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W3634 |
0.31 |
|
| 1991 |
Polinsky AM, Che Y. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation The Rand Journal of Economics. 22: 562-570. DOI: 10.2307/2600989 |
0.31 |
|
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