Mayuko Nakamaru, PhD

Affiliations: 
2005- Social Sciences Institute of Science Tokyo 
Area:
Theoretical Biology, Evolution of cooperation, modeling in social science, socio-ecological systems
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"Mayuko Nakamaru"
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Publications

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Lee JH, Yamaguchi R, Yokomizo H, et al. (2020) Preservation of the value of rice paddy fields: investigating how to prevent farmers from abandoning the fields by means of evolutionary game theory. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 110247
Koike S, Nakamaru M, Otaka T, et al. (2018) Reciprocity and exclusion in informal financial institutions: An experimental study of rotating savings and credit associations. Plos One. 13: e0202878
Shimura H, Nakamaru M. (2018) Large group size promotes the evolution of cooperation in the mutual-aid game. Journal of Theoretical Biology
Nakamaru M, Shimura H, Kitakaji Y, et al. (2017) The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor. Journal of Theoretical Biology
Seki M, Nakamaru M. (2016) Model for gossip-mediated evolution of altruism with various types of false information by speakers and assessment by listeners. Journal of Theoretical Biology
Sekiguchi T, Nakamaru M. (2014) How intergenerational interaction affects attitude-behavior inconsistency. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 346: 54-66
Shimao H, Nakamaru M. (2013) Strict or graduated punishment? Effect of punishment strictness on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games. Plos One. 8: e59894
Rand DG, Armao JJ, Nakamaru M, et al. (2010) Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 265: 624-32
Koike S, Nakamaru M, Tsujimoto M. (2010) Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 264: 143-53
Sekiguchi T, Nakamaru M. (2009) Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 256: 297-304
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