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Ilya Segal - Publications

Affiliations: 
Economics Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 
Area:
MICROECONOMIC THEORY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
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12 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Milgrom P, Segal I. Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation Journal of Political Economy. 128: 1-31. DOI: 10.1086/704074  0.34
2017 Leyton-Brown K, Milgrom P, Segal I. Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. PMID 28652335 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1701997114  0.333
2016 Segal I, Whinston MD. Property Rights And The Efficiency Of Bargaining Journal of the European Economic Association. 14: 1287-1328. DOI: 10.1111/Jeea.12185  0.34
2014 Pavan A, Segal I, Toikka J. Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach Econometrica. 82: 601-653. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta10269  0.327
2013 Athey S, Segal I. An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism Econometrica. 81: 2463-2485. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta6995  0.344
2007 Blumrosen L, Nisan N, Segal I. Auctions with severely bounded communication Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 28: 233-266. DOI: 10.1613/Jair.2081  0.331
2007 Athey S, Segal I. Designing efficient mechanisms for dynamic bilateral trading games American Economic Review. 97: 131-136. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.97.2.131  0.331
2007 Segal I. The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets Journal of Economic Theory. 136: 341-378. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.09.011  0.34
2006 Nisan N, Segal I. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices Journal of Economic Theory. 129: 192-224. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2004.10.007  0.337
2003 Segal I, Whinston MD. Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities Econometrica. 71: 757-791. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00425  0.341
2003 Segal I. Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining Review of Economic Studies. 70: 439-460. DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00251  0.329
2003 Segal I. Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer? Journal of Economic Theory. 113: 147-181. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5  0.323
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