Year |
Citation |
Score |
2019 |
Bhaskar U, Ligett K, Schulman LJ, Swamy C. Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions Games and Economic Behavior. 118: 533-569. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2018.02.009 |
0.634 |
|
2016 |
Bhaskar U, Cheng Y, Ko YK, Swamy C. Hardness results for signaling in Bayesian zero-sum and network routing games Ec 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference On Economics and Computation. 479-496. DOI: 10.1145/2940716.2940753 |
0.505 |
|
2015 |
Bhaskar U, Fleischer L, Hoy D, Huang CC. On the uniqueness of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games Mathematics of Operations Research. 40: 634-654. DOI: 10.1287/Moor.2014.0688 |
0.488 |
|
2015 |
Bhaskar U, Fleischer L, Anshelevich E. A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time Games and Economic Behavior. 92: 232-247. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2013.09.004 |
0.641 |
|
2014 |
Bhaskar U, Ligett K, Schulman LJ. Network improvement for equilibrium routing Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 8494: 138-149. DOI: 10.1145/2728732.2728737 |
0.475 |
|
2014 |
Bhaskar U, Ligett K, Schulman LJ, Swamy C. Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions Proceedings - Annual Ieee Symposium On Foundations of Computer Science, Focs. 31-40. DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2014.12 |
0.581 |
|
2011 |
Bhaskar U, Fleischer L, Anshelevich E. A competitive strategy for routing flow over time Sigecom Exchanges. 10: 23-28. DOI: 10.1145/1998549.1998554 |
0.496 |
|
2010 |
Bhaskar U, Fleischer L, Huang CC. The price of collusion in series-parallel networks Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 6080: 313-326. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24 |
0.47 |
|
2009 |
Bhaskar U, Fleischer L, Hoy D, Huang CC. Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique Proceedings of the Annual Acm-Siam Symposium On Discrete Algorithms. 748-757. |
0.645 |
|
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