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George Tsebelis - Publications

Affiliations: 
University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 
Area:
General
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52 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2018 Tsebelis G. How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba” Homo Oeconomicus. 35: 81-90. DOI: 10.1007/S41412-018-0069-4  0.379
2017 Tsebelis G. The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world European Journal of Political Research. 56: 820-845. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12206  0.354
2016 Tsebelis G. Lessons from the Greek crisis Journal of European Public Policy. 23: 25-41. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1087215  0.463
2016 Tsebelis G, Nardi DJ. A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries British Journal of Political Science. 46: 457-478. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123414000441  0.422
2015 Tsebelis G, Nardi DJ. A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries – CORRIGENDUM British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S000712341500040X  0.311
2014 Tsebelis G, Hahm H. Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact Journal of European Public Policy. 21: 1388-1411. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.929167  0.396
2014 Tsebelis G, Ha E. Coalition theory: a veto players’ approach European Political Science Review. 6: 331-357. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773913000106  0.66
2013 Tsebelis G. Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU Journal of European Public Policy. 20: 1083-1103. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2013.788368  0.448
2012 Alemán E, Tsebelis G. Partidos Políticos y Coaliciones de Gobierno en las Américas PolíTica. 50: 5-32. DOI: 10.5354/0716-1077.2012.25867  0.424
2011 Alemán E, Tsebelis G. Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas Journal of Politics in Latin America. 3: 3-28. DOI: 10.1177/1866802X1100300101  0.435
2008 Tsebelis G. Thinking About the Recent Past and the Future of the EU Journal of Common Market Studies. 46: 265-292. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-5965.2007.00788.X  0.502
2007 Tsebelis G, Rizova TP. Presidential conditional agenda setting in the former communist countries Comparative Political Studies. 40: 1155-1182. DOI: 10.1177/0010414006288979  0.445
2007 Tsebelis G, Proksch SO. The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention Journal of Common Market Studies. 45: 157-186. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-5965.2007.00707.X  0.425
2005 Tsebelis G, Alemán E. Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America World Politics. 57: 396-420. DOI: 10.1353/Wp.2006.0005  0.461
2005 Alemán E, Tsebelis G. The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America Latin American Research Review. 40: 3-26. DOI: 10.1353/Lar.2005.0017  0.398
2005 Yataganas X, Tsebelis G. The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis European Constitutional Law Review. 1: 429-451. DOI: 10.1017/S1574019605004293  0.433
2004 Tsebelis G, Chang ECC. Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries European Journal of Political Research. 43: 449-476. DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-6765.2004.00161.X  0.446
2002 Hug S, Tsebelis G. Veto Players and Referendums around the World Journal of Theoretical Politics. 14: 465-515. DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400404  0.409
2002 Tsebelis G, Yataganas X. Veto Players and Decision-making in the EU After Nice Journal of Common Market Studies. 40: 283-307. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00355  0.455
2001 Tsebelis G, Garrett G. The institutional foundations of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the European union International Organization. 55: 357-390. DOI: 10.1162/00208180151140603  0.463
2001 Tsebelis G, Jensen CB, Kalandrakis A, Kreppel A. Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis British Journal of Political Science. 31: 573-599. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123401000229  0.636
2000 Tsebelis G, Garrett G. Legislative Politics in the European Union European Union Politics. 1: 9-36. DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001001002  0.514
2000 Tsebelis G. Veto Players and Institutional Analysis Governance. 13: 441-474. DOI: 10.1111/0952-1895.00141  0.418
1999 Tsebelis G. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis American Political Science Review. 93: 591-608. DOI: 10.2307/2585576  0.454
1999 Garrett G, Tsebelis G. More reasons to resist the temptation of power indices in the european union Journal of Theoretical Politics. 11: 331-338. DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003004  0.401
1999 Garrett G, Tsebelis G. Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the european union? Journal of Theoretical Politics. 11: 291-308. DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003001  0.419
1999 Kreppel A, Tsebelis G. Coalition Formation in the European Parliament Comparative Political Studies. 32: 933-966. DOI: 10.1177/0010414099032008002  0.481
1999 Tsebelis G, Kalandrakis A. The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals European Journal of Political Research. 36: 119-154. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00465  0.488
1998 Tsebelis G, Kreppel A. The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions European Journal of Political Research. 33: 41-71. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00375  0.392
1997 Garrett G, Tsebelis G. More on the Co-Decision Endgame The Journal of Legislative Studies. 3: 139-143. DOI: 10.1080/13572339708420533  0.322
1997 Tsebelis G, Garrett G. Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's co‐decision procedure The Journal of Legislative Studies. 3: 74-92. DOI: 10.1080/13572339708420519  0.301
1996 Tsebelis G. More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser American Political Science Review. 90: 839-844. DOI: 10.2307/2945847  0.453
1996 Garrett G, Tsebelis G. An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism International Organization. 50: 269-299. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028563  0.511
1996 Tsebelis G, Garrett G. Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European union International Review of Law and Economics. 16: 345-361. DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(96)00021-X  0.474
1995 Money J, Tsebelis G. The Political Power of the French Senate: Micromechanisms of Bicameral Negotiations The Journal of Legislative Studies. 1: 192-217. DOI: 10.1080/13572339508420425  0.445
1995 Tsebelis G. Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament The Journal of Legislative Studies. 1: 65-93. DOI: 10.1080/13572339508420415  0.48
1995 Tsebelis G. Decision Making in Political Systems Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism British Journal of Political Science. 25: 289-325. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007225  0.427
1995 Tsebelis G, Money J. Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France British Journal of Political Science. 25: 101-129. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007080  0.469
1994 Tsebelis G, Stephen R. Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective Political Research Quarterly. 47: 793-820. DOI: 10.1177/106591299404700401  0.39
1993 Tsebelis G. Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence Journal of Theoretical Politics. 5: 349-374. DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005003003  0.412
1992 Money J, Tsebelis G. Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective International Political Science Review. 13: 25-43. DOI: 10.1177/019251219201300103  0.381
1991 Tsebelis G. The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries: Game Theory vs. Decision Theory Journal of Theoretical Politics. 3: 81-101. DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003001006  0.392
1990 Bianco WT, Ordeshook PC, Tsebelis G. Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough? American Political Science Review. 84: 569-586. DOI: 10.2307/1963536  0.402
1990 Tsebelis G. Penalty has no Impact on Crime:: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Rationality and Society. 2: 255-286. DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002003002  0.401
1990 Tsebelis G. Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2: 5-29. DOI: 10.1177/0951692890002001001  0.447
1990 Tsebelis G. Are Sanctions Effective?: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Journal of Conflict Resolution. 34: 3-28. DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034001001  0.41
1989 Tsebelis G. The Abuse Of Probability In Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy American Political Science Review. 83: 77-91. DOI: 10.2307/1956435  0.41
1989 Tsebelis G, Sprague J. Coercion and revolution: Variations on a predator-prey model Mathematical and Computer Modelling. 12: 547-559. DOI: 10.1016/0895-7177(89)90424-X  0.552
1988 Tsebelis G. When Do Allies Become Rivals Comparative Politics. 20: 233. DOI: 10.2307/421668  0.463
1988 Tsebelis G. Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions British Journal of Political Science. 18: 145-170. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400005044  0.395
1986 Tsebelis G, Elster J. Making Sense of Marx American Political Science Review. 80: 1320. DOI: 10.2307/1960872  0.311
1986 Tsebelis G. A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting British Journal of Political Science. 16: 395-404. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400004464  0.407
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