Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ph.D.
Affiliations: | 2006 | Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA |
Area:
Theory Economics, Operations ResearchGoogle:
"Gabriel Weintraub"Parents
Sign in to add mentor| Benjamin Van Roy | grad student | 2006 | Stanford | |
| (Industry dynamics, investment, and market structure.) | ||||
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Publications
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| Bergemann D, Castro F, Weintraub GY. (2020) The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints Journal of Economic Theory. 188: 105055 |
| Balseiro SR, Besbes O, Weintraub GY. (2019) Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment Operations Research. 67: 711-730 |
| Talluri KT, Weintraub GY. (2019) Revenue management and market analytics department in management science Sigecom Exchanges. 17: 37-38 |
| Gur Y, Lu L, Weintraub GY. (2017) Framework Agreements in Procurement: An Auction Model and Design Recommendations Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 19: 586-603 |
| Ifrach B, Weintraub GY. (2016) A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries The Review of Economic Studies. 84: 1106-1150 |
| Adlakha S, Johari R, Weintraub GY. (2015) Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure Journal of Economic Theory. 156: 269-316 |
| Balseiro SR, Besbes O, Weintraub GY. (2015) Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges: Approximations and design Management Science. 61: 864-884 |
| Benkard CL, Jeziorski P, Weintraub GY. (2015) Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries Rand Journal of Economics. 46: 671-708 |
| Njoroge P, Ozdaglar A, Stier-Moses NE, et al. (2013) Investment in two-sided markets and the net neutrality debate Review of Network Economics. 12: 355-402 |
| Olivares M, Weintraub GY, Epstein R, et al. (2012) Combinatorial auctions for procurement: An empirical study of the chilean school meals auction Management Science. 58: 1458-1461 |