James E. Parco, Ph.D.
Affiliations: | 2002 | University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ |
Area:
Management Business Administration, General EconomicsGoogle:
"James Parco"Parents
Sign in to add mentorAmnon Rapoport | grad student | 2002 | University of Arizona | |
(Two -person bargaining under incomplete information: An experimental study of new mechanisms.) |
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Publications
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Parco JE, Murphy RO. (2013) Resistance to truthful revelation in bargaining: Persistent bid shading and the play of dominated strategies Journal of Economic Psychology. 39: 154-170 |
Davis KJ, Levy DA, Parco JE. (2013) Comparing Institutional Level and Technical Core Leaders: How Personality and Organizational Roles Affect Leadership Choices International Journal of Shape Modeling. 13: 5-16 |
Murphy RO, Rapoport A, Parco JE. (2006) The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas Experimental Economics. 9: 147-166 |
Parco JE. (2006) Price-setting power and information asymmetry in sealed bidding Managerial and Decision Economics. 27: 413-434 |
Parco JE, Rapoport A, Amaldoss W. (2005) Two-Stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An Experimental Study Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 49: 320-338 |
Garratt R, Parco J, Qin C, et al. (2005) Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation International Game Theory Review. 7: 407-429 |
Garratt R, Parco JE, Qin CZ, et al. (2005) Potential maximization and coalition government formation International Game Theory Review. 7: 407-429 |
Parco JE, Rapoport A, Amaldoss W. (2005) Two-stage contests with budget constraints: An experimental study Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 49: 320-338 |
Daniel TE, Parco JE. (2005) Fair, efficient and envy-free bargaining: An experimental test of the Brams-Taylor adjusted winner mechanism Group Decision and Negotiation. 14: 241-264 |
Seale DA, Parco JE, Stein WE, et al. (2005) Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions Experimental Economics. 8: 117-144 |