Jean-Jacques Laffont
Affiliations: | University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States |
Area:
General EconomicsGoogle:
"Jean-Jacques Laffont"Parents
Sign in to add mentorKenneth J. Arrow | grad student | 1975 | Harvard |
Jerry Green | grad student | 1975 | Harvard |
Children
Sign in to add traineeDavid Martimort | grad student | ||
Roger Guesnerie | grad student | 1982 | University of Toulouse |
Bharat Bhole | grad student | 2004 | USC |
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Publications
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Guasch JL, Laffont JJ, Straub S. (2008) Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America. Evidence from the water and transport sectors International Journal of Industrial Organization. 26: 421-442 |
Guasch JL, Laffont JJ, Straub S. (2007) Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation Journal of Applied Econometrics. 22: 1267-1294 |
Jeon DS, Laffont JJ. (2006) Labor market information acquisition and downsizing Review of Development Economics. 10: 347-366 |
Estache A, Laffont J, Zhang X. (2006) Universal Service Obligations in LDCs: The Effect of Uniform Pricing on Infrastructure Access Journal of Public Economics. 90: 1155-1179 |
Guasch JL, Laffont JJ, Straub S. (2006) Renegotiation of concession contracts: A theoretical approach Review of Industrial Organization. 29: 55-73 |
Laffont J, Martimort D. (2005) The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries Journal of Public Economics. 89: 159-196 |
Estache A, Laffont J, Zhang X. (2004) Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries China Economic Quarterly. 1 |
Laffont J, Pouyet J. (2004) The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation Journal of Public Economics. 88: 255-283 |
Estache A, Laffont J, Zhang X. (2004) Downsizing with labor sharing and collusion Journal of Development Economics. 73: 519-540 |
Faure-Grimaud A, Laffont J, Martimort D. (2003) Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion B E Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2: 1-32 |