Year |
Citation |
Score |
2020 |
Oyama D, Takahashi S. Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games Econometrica. 88: 693-726. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta17237 |
0.329 |
|
2020 |
Takahashi S, Tercieux O. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs Journal of Economic Theory. 188: 105068. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2020.105068 |
0.318 |
|
2016 |
Matsuyama M, Ishii Y, Sakurai H, Ano S, Morishima Y, Yoh K, Takahashi S, Ogawa K, Hizawa N. Overexpression of RORγt Enhances Pulmonary Inflammation after Infection with Mycobacterium Avium. Plos One. 11: e0147064. PMID 26784959 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147064 |
0.388 |
|
2015 |
Hörner J, Takahashi S, Vieille N. Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games Econometrica. 83: 1795-1848. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta12182 |
0.336 |
|
2014 |
Hörner J, Takahashi S, Vieille N. On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games Games and Economic Behavior. 85: 70-83. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2013.12.010 |
0.319 |
|
2013 |
Sugaya T, Takahashi S. Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring Journal of Economic Theory. 148: 1891-1928. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1876507 |
0.331 |
|
2012 |
Chen B, Takahashi S. A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting Games and Economic Behavior. 76: 571-581. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2012.07.011 |
0.33 |
|
2011 |
Chassang S, Takahashi S. Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games Theoretical Economics. 6: 49-93. DOI: 10.3982/Te795 |
0.321 |
|
2011 |
Oyama D, Takahashi S, Hofbauer J. Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games International Journal of Economic Theory. 7: 251-267. DOI: 10.1111/J.1742-7363.2011.00162.X |
0.341 |
|
2011 |
Fudenberg D, Takahashi S. Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play Games and Economic Behavior. 71: 100-120. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.11.014 |
0.447 |
|
2010 |
Horner J, Sugaya T, Takahashi S, Vieille N. Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem Econometrica. 79: 1277-1318. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1729299 |
0.311 |
|
2008 |
Takahashi S. The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses Games and Economic Behavior. 63: 328-340. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2007.10.003 |
0.326 |
|
2008 |
Takahashi S. Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry International Journal of Game Theory. 37: 15-38. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-007-0101-6 |
0.311 |
|
2007 |
Kojima F, Takahashi S. Anti-Coordination Games And Dynamic Stability International Game Theory Review. 9: 667-688. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001655 |
0.325 |
|
2007 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S. Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient Games and Economic Behavior. 61: 27-49. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2006.11.002 |
0.447 |
|
2005 |
Takahashi S. Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information Games and Economic Behavior. 53: 231-247. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2004.09.012 |
0.303 |
|
2003 |
Takahashi S, Wen Q. On asynchronously repeated games Economics Letters. 79: 239-245. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00325-7 |
0.314 |
|
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