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Yuichi Yamamoto, Ph.D. - Publications

Affiliations: 
Economics University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States 
 2011 Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States 
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9 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Sugaya T, Yamamoto Y. Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games Theoretical Economics. 15: 1175-1219. DOI: 10.3982/Te3820  0.455
2019 Yamamoto Y. Stochastic Games with Hidden States Theoretical Economics. 14: 1115-1167. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2563612  0.522
2014 Yamamoto Y. Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games The Review of Economic Studies. 81: 473-500. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2177923  0.489
2012 Yamamoto Y. Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs Under Conditional Independence Journal of Economic Theory. 147: 1998-2027. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2011773  0.473
2011 Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring Journal of Economic Theory. 146: 1664-1683. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2011.03.004  0.59
2011 Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games Journal of Economic Theory. 146: 1733-1769. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2011.03.003  0.601
2010 Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown Econometrica. 78: 1673-1710. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta8565  0.59
2010 Yamamoto Y. The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games International Journal of Game Theory. 39: 431-443. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-009-0219-9  0.447
2009 Yamamoto Y. A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 802-824. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2008.07.005  0.43
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