☰

Fuhito Kojima - Publications

Affiliations: 
Economics Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 
Area:
GAME THEORY, MARKET DESIGN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, Political Economy
Tree Info Similar researchers PubMed Report error

40 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Kojima F, Sun N, Yu NN. Job Matching under Constraints The American Economic Review. 110: 2935-2947. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20190780  0.352
2020 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints The Japanese Economic Review. 71: 101-133. DOI: 10.1007/S42973-019-00002-1  0.385
2019 Che Y, Kim J, Kojima F. Stable Matching in Large Economies Econometrica. 87: 65-110. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta13547  0.413
2018 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition Theoretical Economics. 13: 761-793. DOI: 10.3982/Te2717  0.435
2018 Kojima F, Tamura A, Yokoo M. Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis Journal of Economic Theory. 176: 803-833. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2018.05.004  0.436
2017 Kojima F, Yamashita T. Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency Theoretical Economics. 12: 1393-1438. DOI: 10.3982/Te2275  0.39
2017 Goto M, Kojima F, Kurata R, Tamura A, Yokoo M. Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 9: 226-262. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.20160124  0.395
2017 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints The American Economic Review. 107: 200-204. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.P20171047  0.388
2017 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints Journal of Economic Theory. 168: 107-142. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.12.006  0.421
2016 Hatfield JW, Kojima F, Narita Y. Improving Schools Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach Journal of Economic Theory. 166: 186-211. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1984876  0.306
2015 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications American Economic Review. 105: 67-99. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20101552  0.448
2015 Che YK, Kim J, Kojima F. Efficient assignment with interdependent values Journal of Economic Theory. 158: 54-86. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.03.008  0.381
2014 Hatfield JW, Kojima F, Kominers SD. Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching The American Economic Review. 104: 436-441. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.104.5.436  0.415
2014 Hatfield JW, Kojima F, Narita Y. Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences Discrete Applied Mathematics. 179: 235-240. DOI: 10.1016/J.Dam.2014.07.003  0.436
2014 Kojima F, Ünver MU. The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach Economic Theory. 55: 515-544. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-013-0769-8  0.361
2013 Budish E, Che YK, Kojima F, Milgrom P. Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications American Economic Review. 103: 585-623. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.103.2.585  0.393
2013 Kojima F, Pathak PA, Roth AE. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 128: 1585-1632. DOI: 10.1093/Qje/Qjt019  0.515
2013 Kojima F. Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand Games and Economic Behavior. 82: 1-14. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2013.06.005  0.358
2012 Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A problem in the Japanese medical match and its solution American Economic Review. 102: 366-370. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.102.3.366  0.404
2012 Kojima F. The “rural hospital theorem” revisited International Journal of Economic Theory. 8: 67-76. DOI: 10.1111/J.1742-7363.2011.00174.X  0.32
2012 Kojima F. School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action Games and Economic Behavior. 75: 685-693. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2012.03.003  0.37
2011 Kojima F. Robust stability in matching markets Theoretical Economics. 6: 257-267. DOI: 10.3982/Te780  0.375
2011 Kojima F, Troyan P. Matching And Market Design: An Introduction To Selected Topics* The Japanese Economic Review. 62: 82-98. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-5876.2010.00525.X  0.36
2010 Kojima F, Manea M. Axioms For Deferred Acceptance Econometrica. 78: 633-653. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta7443  0.342
2010 Hatfield JW, Kojima F. Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts Journal of Economic Theory. 145: 1704-1723. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2010.01.007  0.381
2010 Kojima F, Manea M. Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism Journal of Economic Theory. 145: 106-123. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2009.09.002  0.394
2010 Kojima F. Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms Economics Letters. 107: 69-70. DOI: 10.1016/J.Econlet.2009.12.029  0.369
2009 Kojima F, Pathak PA. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets The American Economic Review. 99: 608-627. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.99.3.608  0.419
2009 Kojima F. Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects Mathematical Social Sciences. 57: 134-142. DOI: 10.1016/J.Mathsocsci.2008.07.003  0.342
2009 Hatfield JW, Kojima F. Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts Games and Economic Behavior. 67: 745-749. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.01.007  0.377
2008 Che Y, Kojima F. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms Econometrica. 78: 1625-1672. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta8354  0.422
2008 Hatfield JW, Kojima F. Matching with Contracts: Comment The American Economic Review. 98: 1189-1194. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.98.3.1189  0.336
2008 Kojima F. The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market Economics Letters. 99: 581-584. DOI: 10.1016/J.Econlet.2007.10.012  0.374
2008 Kojima F. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures Social Choice and Welfare. 31: 357-365. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0287-3  0.325
2008 Kojima F, Ünver MU. Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration International Journal of Game Theory. 36: 473-488. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0037-2  0.409
2007 Kojima F. Matching and Price Competition: Comment The American Economic Review. 97: 1027-1031. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.97.3.1027  0.438
2007 Kojima F, Takahashi S. Anti-Coordination Games And Dynamic Stability International Game Theory Review. 9: 667-688. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001655  0.336
2006 Kojima F. Stability and instability of the unbeatable strategy in dynamic processes International Journal of Economic Theory. 2: 41-53. DOI: 10.1111/J.1365-2966.2006.0023.X  0.316
2006 Kojima F. Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games Journal of Economic Theory. 128: 255-273. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2005.01.006  0.317
2006 Kojima F. Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets Social Choice and Welfare. 27: 25-28. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0139-6  0.402
Show low-probability matches.