Takuo Sugaya, Ph.D. - Publications
Affiliations: | 2012 | Economics | Princeton University, Princeton, NJ |
Area:
MicroeconomicsYear | Citation | Score | |||
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2020 | Deb J, Sugaya T, Wolitzky A. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching Econometrica. 88: 917-964. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta16680 | 0.342 | |||
2020 | Sugaya T, Wolitzky A. The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games The Review of Economic Studies. DOI: 10.1093/Restud/Rdaa041 | 0.356 | |||
2018 | Sugaya T, Wolitzky A. Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games Journal of Economic Theory. 175: 58-87. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2018.01.007 | 0.397 | |||
2017 | Sugaya T, Wolitzky A. Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring Theoretical Economics. 12: 691-729. DOI: 10.3982/Te2270 | 0.356 | |||
2015 | Sugaya T. Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting Theoretical Economics. 10: 691-717. DOI: 10.3982/Te1425 | 0.357 | |||
2014 | Calcagno R, Kamada Y, Lovo S, Sugaya T. Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games Theoretical Economics. 9: 409-434. DOI: 10.3982/Te1202 | 0.365 | |||
2013 | Sugaya T, Takahashi S. Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring Journal of Economic Theory. 148: 1891-1928. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1876507 | 0.372 | |||
2010 | Horner J, Sugaya T, Takahashi S, Vieille N. Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem Econometrica. 79: 1277-1318. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1729299 | 0.349 | |||
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