Thomas E. Wiseman - Publications
Affiliations: | Economics | University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, U.S.A. |
Area:
Theory EconomicsYear | Citation | Score | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2017 | Wiseman T. When Does Predation Dominate Collusion Econometrica. 85: 555-584. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta13121 | 0.347 | |||
2015 | Pęski M, Wiseman T. A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes Theoretical Economics. 10: 131-173. DOI: 10.3982/Te1512 | 0.361 | |||
2015 | Wiseman T. A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory Review of Economic Dynamics. 18: 881-893. DOI: 10.1016/J.Red.2015.09.001 | 0.307 | |||
2012 | Wiseman TE. A partial folk theorem for games with private learning Theoretical Economics. 7: 217-239. DOI: 10.3982/Te913 | 0.379 | |||
2012 | Hendricks K, Sorensen A, Wiseman T. Observational learning and demand for search goods American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 4: 1-31. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.4.1.1 | 0.326 | |||
2012 | Hendricks K, Onur I, Wiseman T. Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry Review of Industrial Organization. 40: 1-19. DOI: 10.1007/S11151-011-9328-2 | 0.347 | |||
2011 | Geraghty TM, Wiseman T. Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945 Explorations in Economic History. 48: 519-537. DOI: 10.1016/J.Eeh.2011.06.002 | 0.31 | |||
2009 | Wiseman TE. Sequential choice and non-Bayesian observational learning International Game Theory Review. 11: 285-300. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002327 | 0.368 | |||
2009 | Wiseman TE. Reputation and Exogenous Private Learning Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 1352-1357. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2009.01.005 | 0.347 | |||
2008 | McAfee RP, Wiseman T. Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture The Review of Economic Studies. 75: 317-331. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.594583 | 0.325 | |||
2008 | Wiseman TE. Reputation and impermanent types Games and Economic Behavior. 62: 190-210. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2007.04.002 | 0.343 | |||
2008 | Geraghty TM, Wiseman T. Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model Explorations in Economic History. 45: 303-326. DOI: 10.1016/J.Eeh.2007.12.003 | 0.344 | |||
2008 | Wiseman TE. Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types☆ Economics Letters. 100: 53-55. DOI: 10.1016/J.Econlet.2007.11.011 | 0.381 | |||
2005 | Wiseman TE. A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions Econometrica. 73: 629-645. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0262.2005.00589.X | 0.361 | |||
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