Year |
Citation |
Score |
2019 |
Crawford VP. Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships Annual Review of Economics. 11: 167-191. DOI: 10.1146/Annurev-Economics-080218-025730 |
0.364 |
|
2018 |
Crawford VP. “Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 156: 219-224. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2018.10.008 |
0.458 |
|
2017 |
Kominers SD, Teytelboym A, Crawford VP. An invitation to market design Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 33: 541-571. DOI: 10.1093/Oxrep/Grx063 |
0.318 |
|
2017 |
Crawford VP. Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level- k thinking Research in Economics. 71: 20-31. DOI: 10.1016/J.Rie.2016.10.001 |
0.354 |
|
2016 |
Crawford VP. New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships Journal of Economic Perspectives. 30: 131-150. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.30.4.131 |
0.482 |
|
2013 |
Belot M, Crawford VP, Heyes C. Players of Matching Pennies automatically imitate opponents' gestures against strong incentives. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 110: 2763-8. PMID 23382227 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1209981110 |
0.383 |
|
2013 |
Crawford VP. Boundedly rational versus optimization-based models of strategic thinking and learning in games Journal of Economic Literature. 51: 512-527. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.51.2.512 |
0.465 |
|
2013 |
Crawford VP, Costa-Gomes MA, Iriberri N. Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications Journal of Economic Literature. 51: 5-62. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.51.1.5 |
0.735 |
|
2011 |
Crawford VP, Meng J. New York city cab drivers' labor supply revisited: Reference-dependent preferences with rational-expectations targets for hours and income American Economic Review. 101: 1912-1932. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.101.5.1912 |
0.367 |
|
2009 |
Crawford VP, Kugler T, Neeman Z, Pauzner A. Behaviorally optimal auction design: Examples and observations Journal of the European Economic Association. 7: 377-387. DOI: 10.1162/Jeea.2009.7.2-3.377 |
0.439 |
|
2009 |
Costa-Gomes MA, Crawford VP, Iriberri N. Comparing Models of strategic thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's coordination games Journal of the European Economic Association. 7: 365-376. DOI: 10.1162/Jeea.2009.7.2-3.365 |
0.734 |
|
2008 |
Crawford VP, Gneezy U, Rottenstreich Y. The power of focal points is limited: Even minute payoff asymmetry may yield large coordination failures American Economic Review. 98: 1443-1458. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.98.4.1443 |
0.383 |
|
2007 |
Crawford VP, Iriberri N. Fatal attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and sophistication in experimental "hide-and-seek" games American Economic Review. 97: 1731-1750. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.97.5.1731 |
0.74 |
|
2007 |
Crawford VP, Iriberri N. Level-k Auctions: Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions? Econometrica. 75: 1721-1770. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00810.X |
0.738 |
|
2006 |
Costa-Gomes MA, Crawford VP. Cognition and behavior in two-person guessing games: An experimental study American Economic Review. 96: 1737-1768. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.586281 |
0.465 |
|
2003 |
Crawford VP. Lying for strategic advantage: Rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions American Economic Review. 93: 133-149. DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455197 |
0.486 |
|
2003 |
Crawford VP, Kuo PS. A dual Dutch auction in Taipei: The choice of numeraire and auction form in multi-object auctions with bundling Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 51: 427-442. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00182-8 |
0.351 |
|
2002 |
Crawford VP. John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior Economics Letters. 75: 377-382. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00624-3 |
0.378 |
|
2002 |
Crawford VP. Introduction to experimental game theory Journal of Economic Theory. 104: 1-15. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2909 |
0.451 |
|
2001 |
Costa-Gomes M, Crawford VP, Broseta B. Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study Econometrica. 69: 1193-1235. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00239 |
0.413 |
|
1998 |
Crawford V. A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk Journal of Economic Theory. 78: 286-298. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1997.2359 |
0.33 |
|
1995 |
Crawford VP. Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games Econometrica. 63: 103. DOI: 10.2307/2951699 |
0.424 |
|
1991 |
Crawford VP. An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination Games and Economic Behavior. 3: 25-59. DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-X |
0.465 |
|
1991 |
Crawford VP. Comparative statics in matching markets Journal of Economic Theory. 54: 389-400. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90129-R |
0.305 |
|
1990 |
Crawford VP, Haller H. Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games Econometrica. 58: 571. DOI: 10.2307/2938191 |
0.409 |
|
1990 |
Crawford VP. On the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the "playing the field" model Journal of Theoretical Biology. 143: 269-273. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80271-1 |
0.417 |
|
1990 |
Crawford VP. Equilibrium without independence Journal of Economic Theory. 50: 127-154. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90088-2 |
0.476 |
|
1989 |
Crawford VP. Learning and mixed-strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Journal of Theoretical Biology. 140: 537-550. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80113-4 |
0.382 |
|
1985 |
Crawford VP. Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory Journal of Conflict Resolution. 29: 195-224. DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029002003 |
0.399 |
|
1985 |
Crawford VP. Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 6: 69-78. DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(85)90025-3 |
0.445 |
|
1984 |
Crawford VP, Sobel J, Takahashi I. Bargaining, Strategic Reserves, and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 66: 472-480. DOI: 10.2307/1240926 |
0.303 |
|
1983 |
Crawford VP, Guasch JL. The theory of contracts and agency American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 65: 373-379. DOI: 10.2307/1240895 |
0.323 |
|
1982 |
Kelso AS, Crawford VP. Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes Econometrica. 50: 1483-1504. DOI: 10.2307/1913392 |
0.356 |
|
1982 |
Crawford VP, Sobel J. Strategic Information Transmission Econometrica. 50: 1431-1451. DOI: 10.2307/1913390 |
0.37 |
|
1982 |
Crawford VP. A Comment on Farber's Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration Journal of Conflict Resolution. 26: 157-160. DOI: 10.1177/0022002782026001006 |
0.335 |
|
1980 |
Crawford VP. A Note on the Zeuthen-Harsanyi Theory of Bargaining Journal of Conflict Resolution. 24: 525-535. DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400307 |
0.35 |
|
1980 |
Crawford VP. Maximin behavior and efficient allocation Economics Letters. 6: 211-215. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(80)90018-X |
0.338 |
|
1979 |
Crawford VP, Varian HR. Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining Economics Letters. 3: 203-206. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(79)90118-6 |
0.393 |
|
1977 |
Crawford VP. A game of fair division Review of Economic Studies. 44: 235-245. DOI: 10.2307/2297064 |
0.45 |
|
1974 |
Crawford VP. Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game Econometrica. 42: 885. DOI: 10.2307/1913795 |
0.361 |
|
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