Year |
Citation |
Score |
2020 |
Andersson T, Ehlers L. Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 122: 937-965. DOI: 10.1111/Sjoe.12362 |
0.366 |
|
2018 |
Ehlers L, Westkamp A. Strategy‐proof tie‐breaking in matching with priorities Theoretical Economics. 13: 1009-1041. DOI: 10.3982/Te2547 |
0.415 |
|
2018 |
Ehlers L. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited Journal of Economic Theory. 176: 393-407. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2018.04.008 |
0.414 |
|
2016 |
Ambec S, Ehlers L. Regulation via the Polluter-pays Principle Economic Journal. 126: 884-906. DOI: 10.1111/Ecoj.12184 |
0.311 |
|
2016 |
Andersson T, Ehlers L, Svensson L. Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach Journal of Economic Theory. 165: 643-671. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.07.004 |
0.36 |
|
2016 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics Games and Economic Behavior. 97: 128-146. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2016.04.001 |
0.427 |
|
2015 |
Ehlers L, Massó J. Matching markets under (in)complete information Journal of Economic Theory. 157: 295-314. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.01.008 |
0.365 |
|
2014 |
Andersson T, Ehlers L, Svensson LG. Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability Theoretical Economics. 9: 753-777. DOI: 10.3982/Te1346 |
0.449 |
|
2014 |
Ehlers L, Hafalir IE, Yenmez MB, Yildirim MA. School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds Journal of Economic Theory. 153: 648-683. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1965074 |
0.316 |
|
2014 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Strategy-proofness makes the difference: Deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities Mathematics of Operations Research. 39: 949-966. DOI: 10.1287/Moor.2014.0662 |
0.396 |
|
2014 |
Andersson T, Ehlers L, Svensson LG. Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities Mathematical Social Sciences. 69: 43-49. DOI: 10.1016/J.Mathsocsci.2014.01.006 |
0.457 |
|
2014 |
Ehlers L. Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods Journal of Economic Theory. 151: 64-87. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2013.12.011 |
0.377 |
|
2011 |
Ehlers L. A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality Series. 2: 447-452. DOI: 10.1007/S13209-011-0038-7 |
0.416 |
|
2011 |
Barberà S, Ehlers L. Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule Social Choice and Welfare. 37: 559-574. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-011-0584-8 |
0.384 |
|
2011 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Corrigendum to "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems" International Journal of Game Theory. 40: 281-287. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-010-0238-6 |
0.355 |
|
2010 |
Dutta B, Ehlers L, Kar A. Externalities, potential, value and consistency Journal of Economic Theory. 145: 2380-2411. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2010.10.007 |
0.3 |
|
2010 |
Ehlers L, Erdil A. Efficient assignment respecting priorities Journal of Economic Theory. 145: 1269-1282. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2010.02.007 |
0.372 |
|
2010 |
Ehlers L. Manipulation via capacities revisited Games and Economic Behavior. 69: 302-311. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.12.006 |
0.312 |
|
2009 |
Ehlers L, Storcken T. Oligarchies in spatial environments Journal of Mathematical Economics. 45: 250-256. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jmateco.2008.09.006 |
0.333 |
|
2009 |
Ehlers L. Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism Economic Theory. 39: 505-512. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0355-7 |
0.326 |
|
2008 |
Ehlers L. Truncation strategies in matching markets Mathematics of Operations Research. 33: 327-335. DOI: 10.1287/Moor.1070.0294 |
0.324 |
|
2008 |
Ehlers L, Sprumont Y. Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules Journal of Mathematical Economics. 44: 87-94. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jmateco.2007.05.004 |
0.341 |
|
2008 |
Ehlers L, Storcken T. Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences Games and Economic Behavior. 64: 533-547. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.02.005 |
0.357 |
|
2008 |
Ambec S, Ehlers L. Sharing a river among satiable agents Games and Economic Behavior. 64: 35-50. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2007.09.005 |
0.378 |
|
2007 |
Ehlers L, Massó J. Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets Journal of Economic Theory. 136: 587-600. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.10.007 |
0.35 |
|
2007 |
Ehlers L. Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems Journal of Economic Theory. 134: 537-547. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.03.006 |
0.334 |
|
2007 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Consistent house allocation Economic Theory. 30: 561-574. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-005-0077-Z |
0.379 |
|
2006 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Efficient priority rules Games and Economic Behavior. 55: 372-384. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2005.02.009 |
0.419 |
|
2005 |
Bogomolnaia A, Deb R, Ehlers L. Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain Journal of Economic Theory. 123: 161-186. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2004.05.004 |
0.424 |
|
2004 |
Ehlers L, Peters H, Storcken T. Threshold strategy-proofness: On manipulability in large voting problems Games and Economic Behavior. 49: 103-116. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2003.10.004 |
0.426 |
|
2004 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems International Journal of Game Theory. 32: 545-560. DOI: 10.1007/S001820400177 |
0.413 |
|
2003 |
Ehlers L. Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules Games and Economic Behavior. 43: 1-27. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00542-0 |
0.416 |
|
2003 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules Review of Economic Design. 8: 249-268. DOI: 10.1007/S10058-003-0101-3 |
0.398 |
|
2003 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems Social Choice and Welfare. 21: 265-280. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-003-0259-1 |
0.432 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B, Pápai S. Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems Journal of Mathematical Economics. 38: 329-339. DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00059-9 |
0.384 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L. Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle Journal of Mathematical Economics. 37: 1-15. DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00002-2 |
0.411 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L. Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued Review of Economic Design. 7: 105-115. DOI: 10.1007/S100580200076 |
0.394 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L. Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences Social Choice and Welfare. 19: 325-348. DOI: 10.1007/S003550100114 |
0.457 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L. Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked Economic Theory. 20: 113-131. DOI: 10.1007/S001990100204 |
0.396 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L, Peters H, Storcken T. Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences Journal of Economic Theory. 105: 408-434. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2829 |
0.364 |
|
2002 |
Ehlers L. Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation Journal of Economic Theory. 105: 298-317. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2813 |
0.364 |
|
2001 |
Ehlers L, Klaus B. Solidarity and probabilistic target rules Journal of Public Economic Theory. 3: 167-184. DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00060 |
0.396 |
|
2001 |
Ehlers L. Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options Mathematical Social Sciences. 41: 239-250. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00059-7 |
0.36 |
|
2000 |
Ehlers L. Indifference and the uniform rule Economics Letters. 67: 303-308. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00274-8 |
0.429 |
|
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