Year |
Citation |
Score |
2019 |
Dellis A, Oak M. Overlobbying and Pareto-Improving Agenda Constraint Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 35: 579-618. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2734444 |
0.35 |
|
2017 |
Dellis A, Gauthier-Belzile A, Oak M. Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections Under the Alternative Vote Rule Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 173: 565-590. DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14799744684614 |
0.551 |
|
2016 |
Cotton CS, Déllis A. Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 32: 762-793. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2109936 |
0.371 |
|
2016 |
Dellis A, Oak M. Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization Social Choice and Welfare. 46: 1-38. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-015-0900-9 |
0.489 |
|
2016 |
Bol D, Dellis A, Oak M. The Political Economy of Social Choices Springer Us. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40118-8_2 |
0.383 |
|
2013 |
Dellis A. The two-party system under alternative voting procedures Social Choice and Welfare. 40: 263-284. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-011-0597-3 |
0.496 |
|
2011 |
Dellis A, D'Evelyn S, Sherstyuk K. Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment Social Choice and Welfare. 37: 171-200. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1271692 |
0.567 |
|
2010 |
Dellis A. Weak Undominance in Scoring Rule Elections Mathematical Social Sciences. 59: 110-119. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1015567 |
0.42 |
|
2009 |
Dellis A. Would Letting People Vote for Multiple Candidates Yield Policy Moderation Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 772-801. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.963665 |
0.586 |
|
2009 |
Dellis A. The Salient Issue of Issue Salience Journal of Public Economic Theory. 11: 203-231. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9779.2009.01407.X |
0.507 |
|
2007 |
Dellis A. Blame-Game Politics in a Coalition Government Journal of Public Economics. 91: 77-96. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.594121 |
0.577 |
|
2007 |
Dellis A, Oak M. Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: The role of policy commitment Social Choice and Welfare. 29: 229-245. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0203-2 |
0.63 |
|
2006 |
Dellis A, Oak MP. Approval voting with endogenous candidates Games and Economic Behavior. 54: 47-76. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2004.10.010 |
0.327 |
|
Low-probability matches (unlikely to be authored by this person) |
2003 |
Cremer H, Dellis A, Pestieau P. Family size and optimal income taxation Journal of Population Economics. 16: 37-54. DOI: 10.1007/S001480100113 |
0.249 |
|
2020 |
Dellis A, Oak M. Subpoena power and informational lobbying Journal of Theoretical Politics. 32: 188-234. DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892339 |
0.241 |
|
Hide low-probability matches. |