Roberto A. Weber, Ph.D. - Publications

2000 California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 
General Economics, Industrial and Labor Relations, Industrial Psychology

42 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Cooper DJ, Hamman JR, Weber RA. Fool Me Once: An Experiment on Credibility and Leadership The Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1093/Ej/Ueaa059  0.398
2020 Garretsen H, Stoker JI, Weber RA. Economic perspectives on leadership: Concepts, causality, and context in leadership research Leadership Quarterly. 31: 101410. DOI: 10.1016/J.Leaqua.2020.101410  0.305
2020 Ging-Jehli NR, Schneider FH, Weber RA. On self-serving strategic beliefs Games and Economic Behavior. 122: 341-353. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2020.04.016  0.325
2019 Bartling B, Valero V, Weber RA. On the Scope of Externalities in Experimental Markets Experimental Economics. 22: 610-624. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2770498  0.318
2018 Beath A, BenYishay A, d’Adda G, Grosjean P, Weber RA. Can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects? Experimental evidence from the Solomon Islands Journal of Public Economics. 160: 117-131. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jpubeco.2018.02.011  0.311
2017 Engl F, Riedl A, Weber RA. Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences and Beliefs Research Memorandum. DOI: 10.26481/Umagsb.2017016  0.418
2017 d’Adda G, Darai D, Pavanini N, Weber RA. Do Leaders Affect Ethical Conduct Journal of the European Economic Association. 15: 1177-1213. DOI: 10.1093/Jeea/Jvw027  0.384
2016 Gino F, Norton MI, Weber RA. Motivated bayesians: Feeling moral while acting egoistically Journal of Economic Perspectives. 30: 189-212. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.30.3.189  0.413
2016 Salmon TC, Weber RA. Maintaining Efficiency While Integrating Entrants From Lower Performing Groups: An Experimental Study Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1111/Ecoj.12308  0.329
2016 Kriss PH, Blume A, Weber RA. Coordination with decentralized costly communication Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 130: 225-241. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2016.07.003  0.301
2015 Brandts J, Cooper DJ, Weber RA. Legitimacy, communication, and leadership in the turnaround game Management Science. 61: 2627-2645. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.2014.2021  0.331
2015 Bartling B, Weber RA, Yao L. Do markets erode social responsibility? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 130: 219-266. DOI: 10.1093/Qje/Qju031  0.343
2015 Georganas S, Healy PJ, Weber RA. On the persistence of strategic sophistication Journal of Economic Theory. 159: 369-400. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.07.012  0.3
2014 Bartling B, Engl F, Weber RA. Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? - An experimental study European Economic Review. 70: 512-524. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2284074  0.361
2014 As˚tebro T, Herz H, Nanda R, Weber RA. Seeking the roots of entrepreneurship: Insights from behavioral economics Journal of Economic Perspectives. 28: 49-69. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.28.3.49  0.403
2014 Malmendier U, Te Velde VL, Weber RA. Rethinking reciprocity Annual Review of Economics. 6: 849-874. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041312  0.339
2013 Gino F, Krupka EL, Weber RA. License to cheat: Voluntary regulation and ethical behavior Management Science. 59: 2187-2203. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.1120.1699  0.387
2013 Krupka EL, Weber RA. Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal of the European Economic Association. 11: 495-524. DOI: 10.1111/Jeea.12006  0.402
2013 Neo WS, Yu M, Weber RA, Gonzalez C. The effects of time delay in reciprocity games Journal of Economic Psychology. 34: 20-35. DOI: 10.1016/J.Joep.2012.11.001  0.344
2012 Lazear EP, Malmendier U, Weber RA. Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 4: 136-163. DOI: 10.1257/App.4.1.136  0.368
2012 McEvily B, Radzevick JR, Weber RA. Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust Games and Economic Behavior. 74: 285-298. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2011.06.011  0.325
2011 Kogan S, Kwasnica AM, Weber RA. Coordination in the presence of asset markets American Economic Review. 101: 927-947. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.101.2.927  0.357
2011 Hamman JR, Weber RA, Woon J. An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods American Journal of Political Science. 55: 738-752. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5907.2011.00531.X  0.366
2010 Hamman JR, Loewenstein G, Weber RA. Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship American Economic Review. 100: 1826-1846. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.100.4.1826  0.335
2010 Rick S, Weber RA. Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback Games and Economic Behavior. 68: 716-730. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.10.004  0.303
2010 Haisley EC, Weber RA. Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior Games and Economic Behavior. 68: 614-625. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.08.002  0.384
2009 Krupka E, Weber RA. The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior Journal of Economic Psychology. 30: 307-320. DOI: 10.1016/J.Joep.2008.11.005  0.374
2007 Hamman J, Rick S, Weber RA. Solving coordination failure with "all-or-none" group-level incentives Experimental Economics. 10: 285-303. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.900383  0.379
2007 Kuang X(, Weber RA, Dana J. How effective is advice from interested parties?. An experimental test using a pure coordination game Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 62: 591-604. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2005.03.010  0.394
2007 Patty JW, Weber RA. Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence Public Choice. 130: 293-310. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-006-9084-2  0.385
2007 Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang JX. Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness Economic Theory. 33: 67-80. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-006-0153-Z  0.373
2006 Lazear E, Malmendier U, Weber R. Sorting, Prices, and Social Preferences National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W12041  0.381
2006 Patty JW, Weber RA. Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 5: 305-320. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.297665  0.374
2006 Loewenstein G, Moore DA, Weber RA. Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others Experimental Economics. 9: 281-295. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-006-9128-Y  0.334
2006 Weber RA, Camerer CF. "Behavioral experiments" in economics Experimental Economics. 9: 187-192. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-006-9121-5  0.399
2005 Glasgow G, Weber RA. Is there a relationship between election outcomes and perceptions of personal economic well-being? A test using post-election economic expectations Electoral Studies. 24: 581-601. DOI: 10.1016/J.Electstud.2005.02.001  0.363
2004 Weber RA, Camerer CF, Knez M. Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and "weak link" coordination games Experimental Economics. 7: 25-48. DOI: 10.1023/A:1026257921046  0.379
2003 Weber RA. 'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game Games and Economic Behavior. 44: 134-144. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00002-2  0.336
2001 Weber R, Camerer C, Rottenstreich Y, Knez M. The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games Organization Science. 12: 582-598. DOI: 10.1287/Orsc.12.5.582.10090  0.389
2001 Weber RA. Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game Experimental Economics. 4: 229-242. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01673535  0.387
2000 McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR, Weber RA. The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2×2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 42: 523-548. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5  0.374
1999 Camerer CF, Weber RA. The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: A re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 39: 59-82. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00026-8  0.369
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