| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2017 |
Yang F, Harstad RM. The Welfare Cost of Signaling Games. 8: 11. DOI: 10.3390/G8010011 |
0.358 |
|
| 2016 |
Harstad RM, Selten R. Diminished-dimensional political economy European Economic Review. 83: 213-219. DOI: 10.1016/J.Euroecorev.2015.08.006 |
0.322 |
|
| 2014 |
Harstad RM, Selten R. Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive Voprosy Economiki. 5: 4-26. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-4-26 |
0.394 |
|
| 2013 |
Harstad RM, Selten R. Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive Journal of Economic Literature. 51: 496-511. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.51.2.496 |
0.394 |
|
| 2010 |
Harstad RM. Auctioning the Right to Choose When Competition Persists Decision Analysis. 7: 78-85. DOI: 10.1287/Deca.1100.0170 |
0.456 |
|
| 2010 |
Jia J, Harstad RM, Rothkopf MH. Information variability impacts in auctions Decision Analysis. 7: 137-142. DOI: 10.1287/Deca.1090.0163 |
0.411 |
|
| 2008 |
Harstad RM, Pekeč AS, Tsetlin I. Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders Games and Economic Behavior. 62: 476-508. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.408560 |
0.398 |
|
| 2007 |
Mares V, Harstad RM. Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly Economic Theory. 32: 399-410. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-006-0123-5 |
0.343 |
|
| 2004 |
Harrison GW, Harstad RM, Rutstrom EE. Experimental methods and elicitation of values Experimental Economics. 7: 123-140. DOI: 10.1023/B:Exec.0000026975.48587.F0 |
0.302 |
|
| 2003 |
Rothkopf MH, Harstad RM, Fu Y. Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly? Management Science. 49: 71-84. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.49.1.71.12748 |
0.401 |
|
| 2003 |
Mares V, Harstad RM. Private information revelation in common-value auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 109: 264-282. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00012-7 |
0.403 |
|
| 2000 |
Harstad RM, Rothkopf MH. An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions Management Science. 46: 1-12. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.46.1.1.15128 |
0.523 |
|
| 2000 |
Harstad RM. Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules Experimental Economics. 3: 261-280. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01669775 |
0.454 |
|
| 1999 |
Harstad RM, Crew MA. Franchise Bidding Without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider Journal of Regulatory Economics. 15: 141-163. DOI: 10.1023/A:1008077710419 |
0.448 |
|
| 1998 |
Waehrer K, Harstad RM, Rothkopf MH. Auction form preferences of risk-averse bid takers Rand Journal of Economics. 29: 179-192. DOI: 10.2307/2555821 |
0.4 |
|
| 1998 |
Rothkopf MH, Pekeč A, Harstad RM. Computationally manageable combinational auctions Management Science. 44: 1131-1147. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.44.8.1131 |
0.368 |
|
| 1996 |
Harstad RM. Laboratory investigations of expectations in games: the Amsterdam papers International Journal of Game Theory. 25: 265-267. DOI: 10.1007/Bf02425257 |
0.337 |
|
| 1995 |
Harstad RM, Rothkopf MH. Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance Operations Research. 43: 983-994. DOI: 10.1287/Opre.43.6.983 |
0.436 |
|
| 1995 |
Rothkopf MH, Harstad RM. Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions The Journal of Business. 68: 257-267. DOI: 10.1086/296663 |
0.514 |
|
| 1995 |
Kagel JH, Levin D, Harstad RM. Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions International Journal of Game Theory. 24: 293-319. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01243157 |
0.484 |
|
| 1995 |
Harstad RM. Privately informed seekers of an uncertain rent Public Choice. 83: 81-93. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01047685 |
0.427 |
|
| 1994 |
Rothkopf MH, Harstad RM. Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay Management Science. 40: 364-384. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.40.3.364 |
0.386 |
|
| 1994 |
Rothkopf MH, Harstad RM. On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions European Journal of Operational Research. 74: 572-581. DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(94)90232-1 |
0.424 |
|
| 1991 |
Harstad RM. Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions Economics Letters. 35: 249-252. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90138-B |
0.472 |
|
| 1990 |
Harstad RM. Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry Journal of Political Economy. 98: 421-429. DOI: 10.1086/261684 |
0.415 |
|
| 1990 |
Harstad RM, Kagel JH, Levin D. Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders Economics Letters. 33: 35-40. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9 |
0.493 |
|
| 1987 |
Kagel JH, Harstad RM, Levin D. Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study Econometrica. 55: 1275-1304. DOI: 10.1515/9781400830138.177 |
0.479 |
|
| 1985 |
Harstad RM, Levin D. A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions The Review of Economic Studies. 52: 525-528. DOI: 10.2307/2297669 |
0.428 |
|
| 1981 |
Harstad RM, Postlewaite A. Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning Management Science. 27: 75-80. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.27.1.75 |
0.415 |
|
| 1981 |
Harstad RM, Marrese M. Implementation of mechanism by processes: Public good allocation experiments☆ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2: 129-151. DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(81)90002-0 |
0.304 |
|
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