| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2020 |
Clark D, Fudenberg D, Wolitzky A. Indirect reciprocity with simple records. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. PMID 32398366 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1921984117 |
0.315 |
|
| 2020 |
Fudenberg D, He K. Payoff information and learning in signaling games Games and Economic Behavior. 120: 96-120. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2019.11.011 |
0.451 |
|
| 2019 |
Block JI, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory Theoretical Economics. 14: 135-172. DOI: 10.3982/Te2626 |
0.398 |
|
| 2019 |
Fudenberg D, Vespa E. Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 11: 186-215. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.20180317 |
0.386 |
|
| 2019 |
Fudenberg D, Liang A. Predicting and Understanding Initial Play American Economic Review. 109: 4112-4141. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20180654 |
0.371 |
|
| 2018 |
Fudenberg D, He K. Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games Econometrica. 86: 1215-1255. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta15085 |
0.41 |
|
| 2018 |
Fudenberg D, Strack P, Strzalecki T. Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices American Economic Review. 108: 3651-3684. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20150742 |
0.351 |
|
| 2018 |
Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 364-381. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.12.021 |
0.683 |
|
| 2017 |
Fudenberg D, Romanyuk G, Strack P. Active learning with a misspecified prior Theoretical Economics. 12: 1155-1189. DOI: 10.3982/Te2480 |
0.381 |
|
| 2017 |
Fudenberg D, DKL. Whither game theory? Towards a theory of learning in games Voprosy Economiki. 5: 116-135. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2017-5-116-135 |
0.398 |
|
| 2017 |
Arechar AA, Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. ‘I’m Just a Soul Whose Intentions Are Good’: The Role of Communication in Noisy Repeated Games Games and Economic Behavior. 104: 726-743. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2748890 |
0.696 |
|
| 2017 |
Arechar AA, Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. “I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games Games and Economic Behavior. 104: 726-743. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.013 |
0.66 |
|
| 2016 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games Journal of Economic Perspectives. 30: 151-170. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.30.4.151 |
0.431 |
|
| 2016 |
Fudenberg D, Peysakhovich A. Recency, Records, and Recaps Acm Transactions On Economics and Computation. 4: 1-18. DOI: 10.1145/2956581 |
0.722 |
|
| 2016 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach Journal of Economic Theory. 161: 1-36. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.10.008 |
0.608 |
|
| 2015 |
Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium Theoretical Economics. 10: 775-806. DOI: 10.3982/Te1362 |
0.648 |
|
| 2015 |
Fudenberg D, Iijima R, Strzalecki T. Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility Econometrica. 83: 2371-2409. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta12660 |
0.374 |
|
| 2015 |
Fudenberg D, Strzalecki T. Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion Econometrica. 83: 651-691. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta11846 |
0.367 |
|
| 2015 |
Fudenberg D. Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 117: 771-800. DOI: 10.1111/Sjoe.12117 |
0.335 |
|
| 2015 |
Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Dreber A. It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 116: 481-499. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2015.05.013 |
0.72 |
|
| 2014 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 111: 10826-9. PMID 25024197 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1400987111 |
0.305 |
|
| 2014 |
Fudenberg D, Peysakhovich A. Recency, records and recaps: Learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem Ec 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th Acm Conference On Economics and Computation. 971-986. DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602872 |
0.783 |
|
| 2014 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maniadis Z. An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk Journal of Economic Psychology. 41: 55-67. DOI: 10.1016/J.Joep.2013.02.007 |
0.308 |
|
| 2014 |
Fudenberg D, Ishii Y, Kominers SD. Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags Journal of Economic Theory. 150: 487-514. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2013.09.004 |
0.621 |
|
| 2014 |
Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 98: 41-55. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2013.12.007 |
0.754 |
|
| 2012 |
Fudenberg D, Rand DG, Dreber A. Slow to anger and fast to forgive: Cooperation in an uncertain world American Economic Review. 102: 720-749. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.102.2.720 |
0.698 |
|
| 2012 |
Aghion P, Fudenberg D, Holden R, Kunimoto T, Tercieux O. Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations Quarterly Journal of Economics. 127: 1843-1881. DOI: 10.1093/Qje/Qjs026 |
0.344 |
|
| 2012 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 81: 606-612. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2011.09.004 |
0.347 |
|
| 2011 |
Archetti M, Ubeda F, Fudenberg D, Green J, Pierce NE, Yu DW. Let the right one in: a microeconomic approach to partner choice in mutualisms. The American Naturalist. 177: 75-85. PMID 21091210 DOI: 10.1086/657622 |
0.311 |
|
| 2011 |
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring Journal of Economic Theory. 146: 1664-1683. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2011.03.004 |
0.642 |
|
| 2011 |
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games Journal of Economic Theory. 146: 1733-1769. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2011.03.003 |
0.647 |
|
| 2011 |
Fudenberg D, Olszewski W. Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal Games and Economic Behavior. 72: 86-99. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2010.08.005 |
0.33 |
|
| 2011 |
Fudenberg D, Takahashi S. Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play Games and Economic Behavior. 71: 100-120. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.11.014 |
0.542 |
|
| 2010 |
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown Econometrica. 78: 1673-1710. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta8565 |
0.63 |
|
| 2010 |
Fudenberg D, Pathak PA. Unobserved punishment supports cooperation Journal of Public Economics. 94: 78-86. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jpubeco.2009.10.007 |
0.397 |
|
| 2010 |
Anderson RM, Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents Games and Economic Behavior. 69: 2-23. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.04.009 |
0.611 |
|
| 2009 |
Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science (New York, N.Y.). 325: 1272-5. PMID 19729661 DOI: 10.1126/Science.1177418 |
0.758 |
|
| 2009 |
Aghion P, Fudenberg D, Holden RT. Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W15167 |
0.315 |
|
| 2009 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Repeated games with frequent signals Quarterly Journal of Economics. 124: 233-265. DOI: 10.1162/Qjec.2009.124.1.233 |
0.375 |
|
| 2009 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning and Equilibrium Annual Review of Economics. 1: 385-420. DOI: 10.1146/Annurev.Economics.050708.142930 |
0.43 |
|
| 2009 |
Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Weighing Reward and Punishment--Response Science. 326: 1632-1633. DOI: 10.1126/Science.326.5960.1632-B |
0.717 |
|
| 2009 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 2354-2371. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2008.07.007 |
0.366 |
|
| 2009 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Random matching in adaptive dynamics Games and Economic Behavior. 66: 98-114. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.04.010 |
0.56 |
|
| 2008 |
Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Winners don't punish. Nature. 452: 348-51. PMID 18354481 DOI: 10.1038/Nature06723 |
0.741 |
|
| 2008 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" [Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (2007) 173-192] (DOI:10.1016/j.red.2007.02.002) Review of Economic Dynamics. 11: 237. DOI: 10.1016/J.Red.2007.06.001 |
0.354 |
|
| 2008 |
Fudenberg D, Imhof LA. Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations Journal of Economic Theory. 140: 229-245. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2007.08.002 |
0.36 |
|
| 2008 |
Ely J, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. When is reputation bad? Games and Economic Behavior. 63: 498-526. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2006.08.007 |
0.379 |
|
| 2007 |
Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? Journal of Theoretical Biology. 247: 574-80. PMID 17481667 DOI: 10.1016/J.Jtbi.2007.03.027 |
0.528 |
|
| 2007 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring Review of Economic Dynamics. 10: 173-192. DOI: 10.1016/J.Red.2007.02.002 |
0.447 |
|
| 2007 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games Journal of Economic Theory. 132: 461-473. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2005.08.006 |
0.409 |
|
| 2007 |
Fudenberg D, Mobius M, Szeidl A. Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 133: 550-567. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2005.07.014 |
0.37 |
|
| 2007 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S. Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient Games and Economic Behavior. 61: 27-49. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2006.11.002 |
0.531 |
|
| 2007 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning Artificial Intelligence. 171: 378-381. DOI: 10.1016/J.Artint.2006.11.006 |
0.396 |
|
| 2006 |
Fudenberg D, Nowak MA, Taylor C, Imhof LA. Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation. Theoretical Population Biology. 70: 352-63. PMID 16987535 DOI: 10.1016/J.Tpb.2006.07.006 |
0.486 |
|
| 2006 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning and Belief Based Trade Latin American Journal of Economics: Formerly Cuadernos De EconomíA. 42: 199-208. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.888762 |
0.397 |
|
| 2006 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Superstition and rational learning American Economic Review. 96: 630-651. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.96.3.630 |
0.399 |
|
| 2005 |
Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 102: 10797-800. PMID 16043717 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.0502589102 |
0.522 |
|
| 2005 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Invited paper: Learning and belief based trade Cuadernos De Economia - Latin American Journal of Economics. 42: 199-207. DOI: 10.4067/S0717-68212005012600001 |
0.4 |
|
| 2005 |
Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Morris S. Topologies on types Theoretical Economics. 1: 275-309. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.798944 |
0.313 |
|
| 2004 |
Taylor C, Fudenberg D, Sasaki A, Nowak MA. Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 66: 1621-44. PMID 15522348 DOI: 10.1016/J.Bulm.2004.03.004 |
0.488 |
|
| 2004 |
Nowak MA, Sasaki A, Taylor C, Fudenberg D. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature. 428: 646-50. PMID 15071593 DOI: 10.1038/Nature02414 |
0.534 |
|
| 2004 |
Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning to play Bayesian games Games and Economic Behavior. 46: 282-303. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00121-0 |
0.394 |
|
| 2004 |
Banerjee A, Fudenberg D. Word-of-mouth learning Games and Economic Behavior. 46: 1-22. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00048-4 |
0.646 |
|
| 2003 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W9528 |
0.585 |
|
| 2003 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Knife-edge or plateau: When do market models tip? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118: 1249-1278. DOI: 10.1162/003355303322552793 |
0.585 |
|
| 2002 |
Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction Journal of Economic Theory. 104: 473-478. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2866 |
0.362 |
|
| 2000 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Customer poaching and brand switching Rand Journal of Economics. 31: 634-657. DOI: 10.2307/2696352 |
0.524 |
|
| 2000 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. The neo-Luddite's lament: Excessive upgrades in the software industry Rand Journal of Economics. 31: 253-272. DOI: 10.2307/2601040 |
0.544 |
|
| 2000 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Pricing a network good to deter entry Journal of Industrial Economics. 48: 373-390. DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00129 |
0.556 |
|
| 2000 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria Journal of Economic Theory. 90: 84-115. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1999.2581 |
0.658 |
|
| 1999 |
Dekel E, Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium Journal of Economic Theory. 89: 165-185. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1999.2576 |
0.381 |
|
| 1999 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Conditional Universal Consistency1 Games and Economic Behavior. 29: 104-130. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1998.0705 |
0.367 |
|
| 1998 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Upgrades, tradeins, and buybacks Rand Journal of Economics. 29: 235-258. DOI: 10.2307/2555887 |
0.567 |
|
| 1998 |
Fudenberg D, Levine D. Learning in games European Economic Review. 42: 631-639. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00011-7 |
0.442 |
|
| 1998 |
Fudenberg D, Levine D, Pesendorfer W. When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? Journal of Economic Theory. 79: 46-71. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1997.2373 |
0.449 |
|
| 1997 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Measuring players' losses in experimental games Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112: 506-536. DOI: 10.1162/003355397555271 |
0.463 |
|
| 1996 |
Fudenberg D, Weibull JW. Evolutionary Game Theory The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 98: 461. DOI: 10.2307/3440739 |
0.38 |
|
| 1995 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Word-of-mouth communication and social learning Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110: 93-125. DOI: 10.2307/2118512 |
0.573 |
|
| 1995 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents Journal of Political Economy. 103: 75-93. DOI: 10.1086/261976 |
0.553 |
|
| 1995 |
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria Games and Economic Behavior. 8: 20-55. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80016-8 |
0.448 |
|
| 1995 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Consistency and cautious fictitious play Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 19: 1065-1089. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(94)00819-4 |
0.401 |
|
| 1994 |
Fudenberg D, Levine D, Maskin E. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information Econometrica. 62: 997. DOI: 10.2307/2951505 |
0.788 |
|
| 1994 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players Journal of Economic Theory. 62: 103-135. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1994.1006 |
0.393 |
|
| 1993 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium Econometrica. 61: 547. DOI: 10.2307/2951717 |
0.422 |
|
| 1993 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Self-Confirming Equilibrium Econometrica. 61: 523. DOI: 10.2307/2951716 |
0.339 |
|
| 1993 |
Eichberger J, Fudenberg D, Tirole J, Myerson RB. Game Theory. The Economic Journal. 103: 1065. DOI: 10.2307/2234726 |
0.605 |
|
| 1993 |
Ellison G, Fudenberg D. Rules of Thumb for Social Learning Journal of Political Economy. 101: 612-643. DOI: 10.1086/261890 |
0.579 |
|
| 1993 |
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Learning Mixed Equilibria Games and Economic Behavior. 5: 320-367. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1993.1021 |
0.471 |
|
| 1992 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed Review of Economic Studies. 59: 561-579. DOI: 10.2307/2297864 |
0.463 |
|
| 1991 |
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games Journal of Economic Theory. 53: 428-438. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90163-X |
0.78 |
|
| 1991 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium Journal of Economic Theory. 53: 236-260. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-W |
0.646 |
|
| 1991 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information Journal of Economic Theory. 54: 26-47. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-B |
0.46 |
|
| 1990 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts Econometrica. 58: 1279. DOI: 10.2307/2938317 |
0.593 |
|
| 1990 |
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Maskin ES. Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players The Review of Economic Studies. 57: 555-573. DOI: 10.2307/2298086 |
0.791 |
|
| 1990 |
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games Journal of Economic Theory. 51: 194-206. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90058-R |
0.779 |
|
| 1990 |
Dekel E, Fudenberg D. Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty Journal of Economic Theory. 52: 243-267. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90033-G |
0.408 |
|
| 1989 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player Econometrica. 57: 759. DOI: 10.2307/1913771 |
0.467 |
|
| 1989 |
Diamond PA, Fudenberg D. Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium Journal of Political Economy. 97: 606-619. DOI: 10.1086/261618 |
0.337 |
|
| 1989 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Chapter 5 Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview Handbook of Industrial Organization. 1: 259-327. DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01008-3 |
0.647 |
|
| 1988 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Erratum: Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology The Review of Economic Studies. 55: 507. DOI: 10.2307/2297399 |
0.512 |
|
| 1988 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players Journal of Economic Theory. 44: 1-18. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90093-2 |
0.398 |
|
| 1988 |
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Levine DK. On the robustness of equilibrium refinements Journal of Economic Theory. 44: 354-380. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90009-9 |
0.468 |
|
| 1987 |
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM. Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents Review of Economic Studies. 54: 541-568. DOI: 10.2307/2297482 |
0.369 |
|
| 1987 |
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Tirole J. Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 102: 37. DOI: 10.2307/1884679 |
0.605 |
|
| 1986 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation The Rand Journal of Economics. 17: 366. DOI: 10.2307/2555717 |
0.569 |
|
| 1986 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. A Theory of Exit in Duopoly Econometrica. 54: 943. DOI: 10.2307/1912845 |
0.572 |
|
| 1986 |
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information Econometrica. 54: 533. DOI: 10.2307/1911307 |
0.791 |
|
| 1986 |
Fudenberg D, Levine D. Limit games and limit equilibria Journal of Economic Theory. 38: 261-279. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90118-3 |
0.485 |
|
| 1985 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology The Review of Economic Studies. 52: 383. DOI: 10.2307/2297660 |
0.641 |
|
| 1983 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance The Bell Journal of Economics. 14: 522. DOI: 10.2307/3003653 |
0.592 |
|
| 1983 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information The Review of Economic Studies. 50: 221. DOI: 10.2307/2297414 |
0.613 |
|
| 1983 |
Fudenberg D, Levine D. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games Journal of Economic Theory. 31: 251-268. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90076-5 |
0.453 |
|
| 1983 |
Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility Journal of Economic Theory. 31: 227-250. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3 |
0.612 |
|
| 1983 |
Fudenberg D, Gilbert R, Stiglitz J, Tirole J. Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races European Economic Review. 22: 3-31. DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(83)90087-9 |
0.572 |
|
| Show low-probability matches. |