| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2020 |
Bradford A, Chang Y, Chilton AS, Garoupa N. Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance The Journal of Law and Economics. 63. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3521492 |
0.433 |
|
| 2020 |
Magalhães PC, Garoupa N. Judicial Performance and Trust in Legal Systems: Findings from a Decade of Surveys in over 20 European Countries Social Science Quarterly. 101. DOI: 10.1111/Ssqu.12846 |
0.343 |
|
| 2020 |
Garoupa N, Magalhães PC. Public trust in the European legal systems: independence, accountability and awareness West European Politics. 43: 1-24. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2020.1715605 |
0.383 |
|
| 2020 |
Garoupa N, Grajzl P. Spurred by legal tradition or contextual politics? Lessons about judicial dissent from Slovenia and Croatia International Review of Law and Economics. 63: 105912. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2020.105912 |
0.477 |
|
| 2020 |
Muro S, Amaral-Garcia S, Chehtman A, Garoupa N. Exploring dissent in the Supreme Court of Argentina International Review of Law and Economics. 63: 105909. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2020.105909 |
0.362 |
|
| 2019 |
Arruñada B, Zanarone G, Garoupa N. Property rights in sequential exchange Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 35: 127-153. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3075131 |
0.369 |
|
| 2019 |
Garoupa N, Mungan MC. Optimal imprisonment and fines with non-discriminatory sentences Economics Letters. 182: 105-108. DOI: 10.1016/J.Econlet.2019.06.016 |
0.317 |
|
| 2017 |
Varol OO, Pellegrina LD, Garoupa N. An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Transformation in Turkey American Journal of Comparative Law. 65: 187-216. DOI: 10.1093/Ajcl/Avx013 |
0.442 |
|
| 2017 |
Garoupa N. Explaining the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law: A New Insight Supreme Court Economic Review. 25: 111-122. DOI: 10.1086/692926 |
0.427 |
|
| 2017 |
Garoupa N. Does being a foreigner shape judicial behaviour? Evidence from the Constitutional Court of Andorra, 1993–2016 Journal of Institutional Economics. 14: 181-195. DOI: 10.1017/S1744137417000133 |
0.4 |
|
| 2017 |
Pellegrina LD, Mot Jd, Faure M, Garoupa N. Litigating Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of Decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court European Constitutional Law Review. 13: 305-346. DOI: 10.1017/S1574019617000050 |
0.41 |
|
| 2017 |
Pellegrina LD, Garoupa N, Gómez-Pomar F. Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: the case of administrative review International Review of Law and Economics. 52: 16-28. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2017.07.003 |
0.355 |
|
| 2015 |
Bianco M, Garoupa N. Introduction to papers from the 8th Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics International Review of Law and Economics. 43: 132-133. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2015.08.004 |
0.387 |
|
| 2015 |
Mora-Sanguinetti JS, Garoupa N. Do lawyers induce litigation? Evidence from Spain, 2001–2010 International Review of Law and Economics. 44: 29-41. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2015.06.003 |
0.422 |
|
| 2014 |
Arlota C, Garoupa N. Addressing Federal Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988–2010 Review of Law & Economics. 10: 1-32. DOI: 10.1515/Rle-2013-0037 |
0.462 |
|
| 2014 |
Cooter RD, Garoupa N. A disruption mechanism for bribes Review of Law and Economics. 10: 241-263. DOI: 10.1515/Rle-2013-0027 |
0.364 |
|
| 2013 |
Acciarri HA, Garoupa N. On the Judicial Interest Rate: Towards a Law and Economic TheoryThe authors are grateful to three anonymous referees, the editor, Ken Oliphant, as well as Francisco Ramos Romeu and AEDE (Spanish Law and Economics Association, Barcelona, 2011) and ALACDE (Latin American Law and Economics Association, Bogota, 2011) participants for useful comments. Caroline Belloff, Melissa Marrero and Roya H Samarghandi have provided excellent research assistantship. The usual disclaimers apply. Journal of European Tort Law. 4: 34-62. DOI: 10.1515/Jetl-2013-0002 |
0.426 |
|
| 2012 |
Garoupa N, Rizzolli M. Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 168: 224-231. DOI: 10.1628/093245612800933988 |
0.41 |
|
| 2012 |
Echazu L, Garoupa N. Corrigendum to “Why not adopt a loser-pays-all rule in criminal litigation?” [Int. Rev. Law Econ. (2012) 233–241] International Review of Law and Economics. 32: 378. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2012.07.002 |
0.424 |
|
| 2012 |
Echazu L, Garoupa N. Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation? International Review of Law and Economics. 32: 233-241. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2012.01.004 |
0.44 |
|
| 2011 |
Garoupa N, Rizzolli M. The Brady Rule May Hurt the Innocent American Law and Economics Review. 13: 168-200. DOI: 10.1093/Aler/Ahq018 |
0.416 |
|
| 2009 |
Salvador-Coderch P, Garoupa N, Gómez-Ligüerre C. Scope of Liability: The Vanishing Distinction between Negligence and Strict Liability European Journal of Law and Economics. 28: 257-287. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.640482 |
0.467 |
|
| 2009 |
Garoupa N. Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution International Review of Law and Economics. 29: 25-28. DOI: 10.1016/J.Irle.2008.07.001 |
0.427 |
|
| 2009 |
Garoupa N. Special issue in law and economics Portuguese Economic Journal. 8: 137-139. DOI: 10.1007/S10258-009-0047-7 |
0.509 |
|
| 2008 |
Garoupa N, Schäfer H. Twenty-Third Annual Conference of the European Association of Law & Economics, Madrid, Spain Review of Law & Economics. 4: 563-564. DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1251 |
0.441 |
|
| 2008 |
Garoupa N, Fernando G. Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law Review of Law & Economics. 4: 1-23. DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1220 |
0.51 |
|
| 2008 |
Garoupa N, Klick J. Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule Review of Law & Economics. 4: 407-418. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.951795 |
0.443 |
|
| 2008 |
Garoupa N, Stephen FH. Why plea-bargaining fails to achieve results in so many criminal justice systems: A new framework for assessment The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law. 15: 323-358. DOI: 10.1177/1023263X0801500303 |
0.453 |
|
| 2007 |
Garoupa N. On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology. An Efficiency Explanation of Privacy Rights Revue éConomique. 58: 1353-1362. DOI: 10.3917/Reco.586.1353 |
0.327 |
|
| 2007 |
Garoupa N, Schäfer H. Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia Review of Law & Economics. 3: 1-2. DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1150 |
0.435 |
|
| 2007 |
Garoupa N, Ulen TS. The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States Alabama Law Review. 59: 1555-1633. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.972360 |
0.48 |
|
| 2007 |
Garoupa N, Pomar FG. Paying the Price for Being Caught: the Economics of Manifest and non-Manifest Theft in Roman Criminal Law Indret. 1. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1024754 |
0.511 |
|
| 2007 |
Garoupa N, Jellal M. Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement European Journal of Law and Economics. 23: 59-69. DOI: 10.1007/S10657-007-9002-1 |
0.451 |
|
| 2006 |
Emons W, Garoupa N. US‐style contingent fees and UK‐style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services Managerial and Decision Economics. 27: 379-385. DOI: 10.1002/Mde.1269 |
0.321 |
|
| 2004 |
Garoupa N, Stephen FH. Optimal law enforcement with legal aid Economica. 71: 493-500. DOI: 10.1111/J.0013-0427.2004.00382.X |
0.474 |
|
| 2003 |
Garoupa N, Gravelle H. Efficient Deterrence does not Require that the Wealthy should be Able to Buy Justice Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 159: 545-552. DOI: 10.1628/0932456032954765 |
0.376 |
|
| 2003 |
Garoupa N. Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review European Journal of Law and Economics. 15: 5-15. DOI: 10.1023/A:1021152523137 |
0.38 |
|
| 2003 |
Garoupa N. Crime and social norms Portuguese Economic Journal. 2: 131-144. DOI: 10.1007/S10258-003-0022-7 |
0.355 |
|
| 2002 |
Barros PP, Garoupa N. An Economic Theory Of Church Strictness The Economic Journal. 112: 559-576. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00730 |
0.406 |
|
| 2002 |
Gravelle H, Garoupa N. Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure Economic Inquiry. 40: 366-379. DOI: 10.1093/Ei/40.3.366 |
0.359 |
|
| 2002 |
Garoupa N, Klerman DM. Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government American Law and Economics Review. 4: 116-140. DOI: 10.1093/Aler/4.1.116 |
0.496 |
|
| 2002 |
Garoupa N, Jellal M. A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information European Journal of Law and Economics. 14: 5-13. DOI: 10.1023/A:1015677632233 |
0.371 |
|
| 2002 |
Bowles R, Garoupa N. Household dissolution, child care and divorce law International Review of Law and Economics. 22: 495-510. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00116-3 |
0.333 |
|
| 2001 |
Garoupa N. Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players Economics of Governance. 2: 231-242. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-05121-4_8 |
0.463 |
|
| 2000 |
Charness G, Garoupa N. Reputation, honesty, and efficiency with insider information: An experiment Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 9: 425-451. DOI: 10.1111/J.1430-9134.2000.00425.X |
0.325 |
|
| 2000 |
Bowles R, Faure M, Garoupa N. Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains International Review of Law and Economics. 20: 537-549. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00049-1 |
0.424 |
|
| 1999 |
Garoupa N. Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information European Journal of Law and Economics. 7: 183-196. DOI: 10.1023/A:1008738128742 |
0.353 |
|
| 1999 |
Garoupa N. The economics of political dishonesty and defamation International Review of Law and Economics. 19: 167-180. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00003-4 |
0.433 |
|
| 1998 |
Garoupa N. Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals Economica. 65: 479-490. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00142 |
0.414 |
|
| 1997 |
Garoupa N. The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement Journal of Economic Surveys. 11: 267-295. DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00034 |
0.423 |
|
| 1997 |
Garoupa N. Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements International Review of Law and Economics. 17: 521-535. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00034-3 |
0.34 |
|
| 1997 |
Garoupa N. A Note on Private Enforcement and Type I Error International Review of Law and Economics. 17: 423-429. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00017-3 |
0.34 |
|
| 1997 |
Bowles R, Garoupa N. Casual police corruption and the economics of crime International Review of Law and Economics. 17: 75-87. DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7 |
0.399 |
|
| 1996 |
Barros PP, Garoupa N. Portugal-European Union convergence: Some evidence European Journal of Political Economy. 12: 545-553. DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00015-8 |
0.309 |
|
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