Year |
Citation |
Score |
2016 |
Caplan B. Soames’s new conception of propositions Philosophical Studies. 1-17. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0633-3 |
0.31 |
|
2013 |
Caplan B, Crampton E, Grove WA, Somin I. Systematically Biased Beliefs About Political Influence: Evidence from the Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey Ps Political Science & Politics. 46: 760-767. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096513001030 |
0.441 |
|
2013 |
Gochenour Z, Caplan B. An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism Review of Austrian Economics. 26: 483-491. DOI: 10.1007/S11138-013-0218-8 |
0.514 |
|
2013 |
Caplan B, Tillman C. Benacerraf's revenge Philosophical Studies. 166: 111-129. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0064-8 |
0.307 |
|
2012 |
Caplan B. The myth of the rational voter and political theory Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. 319-337. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511846427.014 |
0.389 |
|
2012 |
Caplan B, Miller SC. Positive versus normative economics: What's the connection? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy and the General Social Survey Public Choice. 150: 241-261. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-010-9700-Z |
0.394 |
|
2011 |
Caplan B. The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. |
0.427 |
|
2010 |
Caplan B. Persuasion, slack, and traps: How can economists change the world? Public Choice. 142: 1-8. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-009-9521-0 |
0.516 |
|
2009 |
Caplan B. Majorities against utility: Implications of the failure of the miracle of aggregation Social Philosophy and Policy. 26: 198-211. DOI: 10.1017/S0265052509090086 |
0.424 |
|
2008 |
Caplan B, Stringham EP. Privatizing the adjudication of disputes Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 9. DOI: 10.2202/1565-3404.1195 |
0.393 |
|
2008 |
Caplan B. What if the Median Voter Were a Failing Student The Economists' Voice. 5: 1-5. DOI: 10.2202/1553-3832.1394 |
0.323 |
|
2008 |
Althaus S, Caplan B, Friedman J, Somin I, Taleb NN. Roundtable 1: Public ignorance: Rational, irrational, or inevitable? Critical Review. 20: 423-444. DOI: 10.1080/08913810802642950 |
0.351 |
|
2008 |
Caplan B. Reply to my critics Critical Review. 20: 377-413. DOI: 10.1080/08913810802567264 |
0.368 |
|
2008 |
Caplan B. Mises' democracy-dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique Review of Austrian Economics. 21: 45-59. DOI: 10.1007/S11138-007-0028-Y |
0.453 |
|
2007 |
Beaulier S, Caplan B. Behavioral economics and perverse effects of the welfare state Kyklos. 60: 485-507. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-6435.2007.00382.X |
0.457 |
|
2007 |
Caplan B. Have the experts been weighed, measured, and found wanting? Critical Review. 19: 81-91. DOI: 10.1080/08913810701499668 |
0.337 |
|
2007 |
Caplan B. Beyond conventional economics: The limits of rational behaviour in political decision making Public Choice. 131: 505-507. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-007-9142-4 |
0.372 |
|
2006 |
Caplan B. The economics of Szasz: Preferences, constraints and mental illness Rationality and Society. 18: 333-366. DOI: 10.1177/1043463106066377 |
0.372 |
|
2006 |
Caplan B. Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model Public Choice. 128: 91-107. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-006-9046-8 |
0.405 |
|
2006 |
Caplan B. How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the survey of Americans and economists on the economy Public Choice. 128: 367-381. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-006-9026-Z |
0.376 |
|
2005 |
Caplan B, Stringham E. Mises, Bastiat, public opinion, and public choice Review of Political Economy. 17: 79-105. DOI: 10.1080/0953825042000313825 |
0.437 |
|
2005 |
Caplan B. Toward a new consensus on the economics of socialism: Rejoinder to my critics Critical Review. 17: 203-220. DOI: 10.1080/08913810508443636 |
0.363 |
|
2004 |
Caplan B, Cowen T. Do we underestimate the benefits of cultural competition? American Economic Review. 94: 402-407. DOI: 10.1257/0002828041302154 |
0.347 |
|
2004 |
Caplan B. Is socialism really “impossible”? Critical Review. 16: 33-52. DOI: 10.1080/08913810408443598 |
0.339 |
|
2004 |
Caplan B. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work Public Choice. 121: 260-262. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-004-0810-3 |
0.379 |
|
2003 |
Caplan B. The logic of collective belief Rationality and Society. 15: 218-242. DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015002003 |
0.444 |
|
2003 |
Caplan B. The idea trap: The political economy of growth divergence European Journal of Political Economy. 19: 183-203. DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00002-8 |
0.47 |
|
2003 |
Caplan B. Stigler-Becker versus Myers-Briggs: Why preference-based explanations are scientifically meaningful and emperically important Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 50: 391-405. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00031-8 |
0.338 |
|
2003 |
Caplan B. Probability and the synthetic a Priori : A reply to block Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. 6: 77-83. DOI: 10.1007/S12113-003-1025-Z |
0.365 |
|
2002 |
Caplan B. Sociotropes, systematic bias, and political failure: Reflections on the survey of Americans and economists on the economy Social Science Quarterly. 83: 416-435. DOI: 10.1111/1540-6237.00092 |
0.464 |
|
2002 |
Caplan B. Systematically biased beliefs about economics: Robust evidence of judgemental anomalies from the survey of Americans and economists on the economy Economic Journal. 112: 433-458. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00041 |
0.419 |
|
2002 |
Caplan B. How does war shock the economy? Journal of International Money and Finance. 21: 145-162. DOI: 10.1016/S0261-5606(01)00046-8 |
0.362 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. Has Leviathan been bound? A theory of imperfectly constrained government with evidence from the states Southern Economic Journal. 67: 825-847. DOI: 10.2307/1061573 |
0.382 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. Rational ignorance versus rational irrationality Kyklos. 54: 3-26. DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00138 |
0.429 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. What makes people think like economists? Evidence on economic cognition from the "survey of Americans and economists on the economy", Journal of Law and Economics. 44: 395-426. DOI: 10.1086/322812 |
0.403 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. Standing Tiebout on his head: Tax capitalization and the monopoly power of local governments Public Choice. 108: 101-122. DOI: 10.1023/A:1017564623294 |
0.405 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. Rational irrationality and the microfoundations of political failure Public Choice. 107: 311-331. DOI: 10.1023/A:1010311704540 |
0.422 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity Public Choice. 106: 193-195. DOI: 10.1023/A:1005252811893 |
0.384 |
|
2001 |
Caplan B. When is two better than one? How federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition Journal of Public Economics. 80: 99-119. DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00106-7 |
0.469 |
|
1999 |
Caplan B. The Austrian search for realistic foundations Southern Economic Journal. 65: 823-838. DOI: 10.2307/1061278 |
0.409 |
|
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