Year |
Citation |
Score |
2020 |
Morris S, Kajii A. Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey The Japanese Economic Review. 71: 7-34. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.283477 |
0.349 |
|
2019 |
Bergemann D, Brooks BA, Morris S. First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction Sigecom Exchanges. 16: 27-37. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3186516 |
0.624 |
|
2019 |
Morris S, Yildiz M. Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks The American Economic Review. 109: 2823-2854. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2885460 |
0.346 |
|
2019 |
Bergemann D, Morris S. Information Design: A Unified Perspective Journal of Economic Literature. 57: 44-95. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.20181489 |
0.36 |
|
2019 |
Bergemann D, Brooks BA, Morris S. Revenue Guarantee Equivalence The American Economic Review. 109: 1911-1929. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20180773 |
0.649 |
|
2018 |
Bergemann D, Brooks BA, Morris S. Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model Theoretical Economics. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3287049 |
0.606 |
|
2017 |
Bergemann D, Brooks BA, Morris S. First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue Econometrica. 85: 107-143. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta13958 |
0.641 |
|
2017 |
Bergemann D, Morris S, Takahashi S. Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability Journal of Economic Theory. 168: 329-371. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1729280 |
0.323 |
|
2016 |
Bergemann D, Morris S. Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games Theoretical Economics. 11: 487-522. DOI: 10.3982/Te1808 |
0.39 |
|
2016 |
Bergemann D, Morris S. Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium The American Economic Review. 106: 586-591. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.P20161046 |
0.365 |
|
2016 |
Morris S, Shin HS, Yildiz M. Common belief foundations of global games Journal of Economic Theory. 163: 826-848. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.03.007 |
0.31 |
|
2015 |
Bergemann D, Heumann T, Morris S. Information and Market Power Levine's Bibliography. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2639692 |
0.43 |
|
2015 |
Bergemann D, Brooks B, Morris S. The limits of price discrimination American Economic Review. 105: 921-957. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2288718 |
0.627 |
|
2013 |
Bhaskar V, Mailath GJ, Morris S. A foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory Review of Economic Studies. 80: 925-948. DOI: 10.1093/Restud/Rds047 |
0.311 |
|
2008 |
Bhaskar V, Mailath GJ, Morris S. Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma Review of Economic Dynamics. 11: 515-528. DOI: 10.1016/J.Red.2007.10.004 |
0.325 |
|
2007 |
Bergemann D, Morris S. Belief Free Incomplete Information Games Levine's Bibliography. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1015247 |
0.359 |
|
2007 |
Bhaskar V, Mailath GJ, Morris S. Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version Levine's Bibliography. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1008474 |
0.31 |
|
2006 |
Morris S, Shin HS, Kiyotaki N, Angeletos M, Atkeson A. Inertia of forward-looking expectations American Economic Review. 96: 152-157. DOI: 10.1257/000282806777212297 |
0.346 |
|
2006 |
Fang H, Morris S. Multidimensional Private Value Auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 126: 1-30. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2004.11.002 |
0.426 |
|
2004 |
Corsetti G, Dasgupta A, Morris S, Shin HS. Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders The Review of Economic Studies. 71: 87-113. DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00277 |
0.588 |
|
2004 |
Morris S, Shin HS. Liquidity black holes Review of Finance. 8: 1-18. DOI: 10.1023/B:Eufi.0000022155.98681.25 |
0.319 |
|
2004 |
Morris S, Shin HS. Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt European Economic Review. 48: 133-153. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00239-8 |
0.379 |
|
2002 |
Morris S, Shin HS. Social Value of Public Information The American Economic Review. 92: 1521-1534. DOI: 10.1257/000282802762024610 |
0.357 |
|
2002 |
Amato JD, Morris S, Shin HS. Communication and Monetary Policy Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 18: 495-503. DOI: 10.1093/Oxrep/18.4.495 |
0.332 |
|
2002 |
Mailath GJ, Morris S. Repeated games with almost-public monitoring Journal of Economic Theory. 102: 189-228. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2869 |
0.308 |
|
2002 |
Baliga S, Morris S. Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk Journal of Economic Theory. 105: 450-468. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2855 |
0.374 |
|
2000 |
Morris S, Shin HS. Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling Nber Macroeconomics Annual. 15: 139-182. DOI: 10.1162/08893360052390301 |
0.343 |
|
1998 |
Kajii A, Morris S. Payoff Continuity In Incomplete Information Games Journal of Economic Theory. 82: 267-276. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1998.2418 |
0.375 |
|
1997 |
Kajii A, Morris S. The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information Econometrica. 65: 1283-1309. DOI: 10.2307/2171737 |
0.408 |
|
1997 |
Morris S. Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction, and Random Matching Research in Economics. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.290880 |
0.336 |
|
1997 |
Dutta J, Morris S. The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs Journal of Economic Theory. 73: 231-244. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1996.2234 |
0.371 |
|
1995 |
Morris S, Rob R, Shin HS. P-dominance and belief potential Econometrica. 63: 145-157. DOI: 10.2307/2951700 |
0.348 |
|
1994 |
Morris S. Trade With Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs And Asymmetric Information Econometrica. 62: 1327-1347. DOI: 10.2307/2951751 |
0.39 |
|
1993 |
Allen F, Morris S, Postlewaite A. Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information Journal of Economic Theory. 61: 206-229. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1993.1067 |
0.368 |
|
Show low-probability matches. |