| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2019 |
Levi M, Weingast BR. Douglass North’s Theory of Politics Ps Political Science & Politics. 52: 213-217. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096518002111 |
0.563 |
|
| 2019 |
Carugati F, Ober J, Weingast BR. Is development uniquely modern? Ancient Athens on the doorstep Public Choice. 181: 29-47. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-018-00632-W |
0.476 |
|
| 2018 |
Cox GW, Weingast BR. Executive Constraint, Political Stability and Economic Growth Comparative Political Studies. 51: 279-303. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2618059 |
0.659 |
|
| 2016 |
Weingast BR. Exposing the neoclassical fallacy: McCloskey on ideas and the great enrichment Scandinavian Economic History Review. 64: 189-201. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2837045 |
0.579 |
|
| 2016 |
Carugati F, Ober J, Weingast BR. Development and Political Theory in Classical Athens Polis (United Kingdom). 33: 71-91. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2616105 |
0.604 |
|
| 2016 |
Rodriguez DB, Weingast BR. The "reformation of administrative law" revisited Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 31: 782-807. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/Ewv018 |
0.544 |
|
| 2016 |
Rodriguez DB, Stiglitz EH, Weingast BR. Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers Journal of Legal Analysis. 8: 95-119. DOI: 10.1093/Jla/Lav013 |
0.483 |
|
| 2016 |
Albertus M, Diaz-Cayeros A, Magaloni B, Weingast BR. Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico World Development. 77: 154-170. DOI: 10.1016/J.Worlddev.2015.08.013 |
0.509 |
|
| 2015 |
Weingast BR. Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions Supreme Court Economic Review. 23: 255-277. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2639793 |
0.558 |
|
| 2015 |
Carugati F, Hadfield GK, Weingast BR. Building legal order in ancient athens Journal of Legal Analysis. 7: 291-324. DOI: 10.1093/Jla/Lav003 |
0.511 |
|
| 2014 |
Hadfield GK, Weingast BR. Microfoundations of the rule of law Annual Review of Political Science. 17: 21-42. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2342882 |
0.566 |
|
| 2014 |
Weingast BR. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development World Development. 53: 14-25. DOI: 10.1016/J.Worlddev.2013.01.003 |
0.599 |
|
| 2013 |
Mittal S, Weingast BR. Self-enforcing constitutions: With an application to democratic stability in America's first century Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 29: 278-302. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1153527 |
0.437 |
|
| 2013 |
Hadfield GK, Weingast BR. Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment Journal of Law and Courts. 1: 3-34. DOI: 10.1086/668604 |
0.561 |
|
| 2012 |
North D, Wallis J, Webb S, Weingast B. In the Shadow of Violence: Lessons for Limited Access Societies Voprosy Economiki. 3: 4-31. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2012-3-4-31 |
0.725 |
|
| 2012 |
Hadfield GK, Weingast BR. What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order Journal of Legal Analysis. 4: 471-514. DOI: 10.1093/Jla/Las008 |
0.518 |
|
| 2012 |
Alberts S, Warshaw C, Weingast BR. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: Power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Comparative Constitutional Design. 69-100. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139105712.006 |
0.307 |
|
| 2012 |
Hadfield GK, Weingast BR. Constitutions as coordinating devices Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: the Legacy of Douglass North. 121-150. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107300361.009 |
0.429 |
|
| 2012 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock Public Choice. 152: 83-95. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-011-9853-4 |
0.467 |
|
| 2012 |
Careaga M, Weingast BR. Fiscal federalism, good governance, and economic growth in Mexico In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives On Economic Growth. 399-435. |
0.347 |
|
| 2011 |
Chávez RB, Ferejohn JA, Weingast BR. A theory of the politically independent judiciary: A comparative study of the United States and Argentina Courts in Latin America. 219-247. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511976520.009 |
0.477 |
|
| 2010 |
Stiglitz EH, Weingast BR. Agenda control in congress: Evidence from cutpoint estimates and ideal point uncertainty Legislative Studies Quarterly. 35: 157-185. DOI: 10.3162/036298010791170187 |
0.339 |
|
| 2009 |
McCubbins MD, Rodriguez DB, Weingast BR. The Rule of Law Unplugged Emory Law Journal. 59: 1455-1494. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1467797 |
0.55 |
|
| 2009 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Webb SB, Weingast BR. Limited access orders: An introduction to the conceptual framework In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. 1-23. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139013611.001 |
0.694 |
|
| 2009 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Webb SB, Weingast BR. In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics, and the problems of development In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. 1-350. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139013611 |
0.722 |
|
| 2009 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history Violence and Social Orders: a Conceptual Framework For Interpreting Recorded Human History. 1-308. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511575839 |
0.734 |
|
| 2009 |
Weingast BR. Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives Journal of Urban Economics. 65: 279-293. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jue.2008.12.005 |
0.502 |
|
| 2009 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. Violence and the rise of open-access orders Journal of Democracy. 20: 55-68. |
0.571 |
|
| 2008 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders Journal of Democracy. 20: 55-68. DOI: 10.1353/Jod.0.0060 |
0.67 |
|
| 2008 |
De Figueiredo RJP, Jacobi T, Weingast BR. The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0011 |
0.348 |
|
| 2008 |
Weingast BR, Wittman DA. The Reach of Political Economy The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0001 |
0.4 |
|
| 2008 |
Weingast BR, Wittman DA. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 1-1112. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.001.0001 |
0.544 |
|
| 2008 |
Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. Dysfunctional or optimal institutions? State debt limitations, the structure of state and local governments, and the finance of American infrastructure Fiscal Challenges: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy. 331-365. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511462.012 |
0.36 |
|
| 2007 |
De Figueiredo RJP, McFaul M, Weingast BR, Krebs WC. Constructing self-enforcing federalism in the early United States and modern Russia Publius. 37: 160-189. DOI: 10.1093/Publius/Pjm002 |
0.391 |
|
| 2006 |
North DC, Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History National Bureau of Economic Research. 2006. DOI: 10.3386/W12795 |
0.734 |
|
| 2006 |
De Figueiredo RJP, Rakove J, Weingast BR. Rationality, inaccurate mental models, and self-confirming equilibrium: A new understanding of the American revolution Journal of Theoretical Politics. 18: 384-415. DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067451 |
0.419 |
|
| 2006 |
Cohen DK, Cuéllar MF, Weingast BR. Crisis bureaucracy: Homeland security and the political design of legal mandates Stanford Law Review. 59: 673-760. |
0.335 |
|
| 2005 |
Wallis JJ, Weingast BR. Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W11397 |
0.513 |
|
| 2005 |
Weingast BR. The constitutional dilemma of economic liberty Journal of Economic Perspectives. 19: 89-108. DOI: 10.1257/089533005774357815 |
0.515 |
|
| 2005 |
De Figueiredo RJP, Weingast BR. Self-enforcing federalism Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 21: 103-135. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/Ewi005 |
0.467 |
|
| 2005 |
Jin H, Qian Y, Weingast BR. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style Journal of Public Economics. 89: 1719-1742. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jpubeco.2004.11.008 |
0.507 |
|
| 2004 |
Morris I, Weingast BR. Views and comments on institutions, economics and the ancient Mediterranean world: Introduction Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 160: 702-708. DOI: 10.1628/0932456042776041 |
0.443 |
|
| 2004 |
Hanson SE, Jupille J, Olson DJ, Weingast BR. Margaret Levi: Institutions, Individuals, Organizations, and Trust in Democratic Regimes Ps Political Science & Politics. 37: 895-898. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096504045391 |
0.493 |
|
| 2003 |
Rodriguez DB, Weingast BR. The positive political theory of legislative history: New perspectives on the 1964 civil rights act and its interpretation University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 151: 1417-1542. DOI: 10.2307/3312937 |
0.542 |
|
| 2003 |
Schultz KA, Weingast BR. The democratic advantage: Institutional foundations of financial power in international competition International Organization. 57: 3-42+i. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818303571065 |
0.513 |
|
| 2003 |
Weingast BR. A postscript to “political foundations of democracy and the rule of law” Democracy and the Rule of Law. 109-113. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610066.005 |
0.503 |
|
| 2000 |
Bates RH, Greif A, Levi M, Rosenthal J, Weingast BR. The Analytic Narrative Project American Political Science Review. 94. DOI: 10.2307/2585843 |
0.347 |
|
| 2000 |
Snyder SK, Weingast BR. The American system of shared powers: The president, congress, and the NLRB Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 16: 269-305. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/16.2.269 |
0.483 |
|
| 2000 |
North DC, Weingast BR. Introduction: Institutional Analysis and Economic History Journal of Economic History. 60: 414-417. DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700025158 |
0.729 |
|
| 1999 |
Cao Y, Qian Y, Weingast BR. From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style Economics of Transition. 7: 103-181. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.57564 |
0.496 |
|
| 1998 |
Bates RH, De Figueiredo RJP, Weingast BR. The politics of interpretation: Rationality, culture, and transition Politics and Society. 26: 603-642. DOI: 10.1177/0032329298026004007 |
0.411 |
|
| 1997 |
Weingast BR. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law American Political Science Review. 91: 245-263. DOI: 10.2307/2952354 |
0.554 |
|
| 1997 |
Bailey MA, Goldstein J, Weingast BR. The institutional roots of American trade policy : Politics, coalitions, and international trade World Politics. 49: 309-338. DOI: 10.1353/Wp.1997.0007 |
0.527 |
|
| 1997 |
Qian Y, Weingast BR. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11: 83-92. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.11.4.83 |
0.422 |
|
| 1997 |
Weingast BR. The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law American Political Science Review. 91: 245-263. |
0.474 |
|
| 1996 |
Weingast BR. The Myth of Demócratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. By Donald Wittman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 240p. $29.95 American Political Science Review. 90: 663-664. DOI: 10.2307/2082658 |
0.438 |
|
| 1995 |
Montinola G, Qian Y, Weingast BR. Federalism, chinese style the political basis for economic success in china World Politics. 48: 50-81. DOI: 10.1353/Wp.1995.0003 |
0.536 |
|
| 1995 |
Weingast BR. A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation Politics &Amp; Society. 23: 449-464. DOI: 10.1177/0032329295023004003 |
0.373 |
|
| 1995 |
Weingast BR. The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 11: 1-31. DOI: 10.1093/Oxfordjournals.Jleo.A036861 |
0.576 |
|
| 1994 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Positive theories of congressional institutions Legislative Studies Quarterly. 19: 149. DOI: 10.3998/Mpub.23248 |
0.483 |
|
| 1994 |
Myhrman J, Weingast BR. Douglass C. North's Contributions to Economics and Economic History The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 96: 185-193. DOI: 10.2307/3440597 |
0.542 |
|
| 1994 |
Weingast BR. Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism Political Research Quarterly. 47: 319-327. DOI: 10.1177/106591299404700204 |
0.432 |
|
| 1994 |
Greif A, Milgrom P, Weingast BR. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild Journal of Political Economy. 102: 745-776. DOI: 10.1086/261953 |
0.408 |
|
| 1992 |
Banks JS, Weingast BR. The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information American Journal of Political Science. 36: 509. DOI: 10.2307/2111488 |
0.427 |
|
| 1992 |
Weingast BR, Charles S. Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development Studies in American Political Development. 6: 223-271. DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X00000985 |
0.575 |
|
| 1990 |
Gilligan TW, Marshall WJ, Weingast BR. The economic incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: a theoretical and empirical analysis of the short-haul pricing constraint The Rand Journal of Economics. 21: 189-210. DOI: 10.2307/2555418 |
0.357 |
|
| 1990 |
Milgrom PR, North DC, Weingast* BR. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS Economics and Politics. 2: 1-23. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0343.1990.Tb00020.X |
0.608 |
|
| 1990 |
McCubbins MD, Noll RG, Weingast BR. Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures Journal of Law Economics & Organization. 6: 307-332. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/6.Special_Issue.307 |
0.358 |
|
| 1990 |
Weingast BR. The role of credible commitments in state finance Public Choice. 66: 89-97. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00155648 |
0.492 |
|
| 1989 |
Calvert RL, McCubbins MD, Weingast BR. A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion American Journal of Political Science. 33: 588-611. DOI: 10.2307/2111064 |
0.5 |
|
| 1989 |
Weingast BR. Floor behavior in the U.S. congress: Committee power under the open rule American Political Science Review. 83: 795-815. DOI: 10.2307/1962061 |
0.432 |
|
| 1989 |
McCubbins MD, Noll RG, Weingast BR. Structure And Process, Politics And Policy: Administrative Arrangements And The Political Control Of Agencies Virginia Law Review. 75: 431-482. DOI: 10.2307/1073179 |
0.5 |
|
| 1989 |
Gilligan TW, Marshall WJ, Weingast BR. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 The Journal of Law and Economics. 32: 35-61. DOI: 10.1086/467168 |
0.348 |
|
| 1989 |
North DC, Weingast BR. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England The Journal of Economic History. 49: 803-832. DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700009451 |
0.702 |
|
| 1988 |
Riker WH, Weingast BR. Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures Virginia Law Review. 74: 373. DOI: 10.2307/1073147 |
0.519 |
|
| 1988 |
Weingast BR, Marshall WJ. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets Journal of Political Economy. 96: 132-163. DOI: 10.1086/261528 |
0.412 |
|
| 1987 |
Krehbiel K, Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Why are Congressional Committees Powerful? American Political Science Review. 81: 929-945. DOI: 10.2307/1962684 |
0.386 |
|
| 1987 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power American Political Science Review. 81: 85-104. DOI: 10.2307/1960780 |
0.572 |
|
| 1987 |
Mccubbins MD, Noll RG, Weingast BR. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 3: 243-277. DOI: 10.1093/Oxfordjournals.Jleo.A036930 |
0.403 |
|
| 1986 |
Weingast BR, Moran MJ. Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission] Journal of Political Economy. 94: 890-894. DOI: 10.1086/261414 |
0.427 |
|
| 1985 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Policy Consequences of Government by Congressional Subcommittees Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 35: 114. DOI: 10.2307/1173938 |
0.32 |
|
| 1984 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. When Do Rules of Procedure Matter? The Journal of Politics. 46: 206-221. DOI: 10.2307/2130440 |
0.439 |
|
| 1984 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions American Journal of Political Science. 28: 49. DOI: 10.2307/2110787 |
0.398 |
|
| 1984 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Political Solutions to Market Problems American Political Science Review. 78: 417-434. DOI: 10.2307/1963373 |
0.493 |
|
| 1984 |
Weingast BR. The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC) Public Choice. 44: 147-191. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00124821 |
0.551 |
|
| 1983 |
Weingast BR, Moran MJ. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission Journal of Political Economy. 91: 765-800. DOI: 10.1086/261181 |
0.362 |
|
| 1982 |
Calvert RL, Weingast BR. RUNAWAY BUREAUCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: WHY REFORMS FAIL Review of Policy Research. 1: 557-564. DOI: 10.1111/J.1541-1338.1982.Tb00461.X |
0.432 |
|
| 1981 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization American Journal of Political Science. 25: 96. DOI: 10.2307/2110914 |
0.551 |
|
| 1981 |
Weingast BR. Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships Law and Contemporary Problems. 44: 147-177. DOI: 10.2307/1191389 |
0.483 |
|
| 1981 |
Weingast BR, Shepsle KA, Johnsen C. The political economy of benefits and costs: a neoclassical approach to distributive politics Journal of Political Economy. 89: 642-664. DOI: 10.1086/260997 |
0.51 |
|
| 1981 |
Shepsle KA, Weingast BR. Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice Public Choice. 37: 503-519. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00133748 |
0.526 |
|
| 1979 |
Weingast BR. A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms American Journal of Political Science. 23: 245. DOI: 10.2307/2111001 |
0.341 |
|
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