Thomas R. Palfrey - Publications

California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 
Theory Economics, General, Public Administration

73 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2016 Camerer C, Nunnari S, Palfrey TR. Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions Games and Economic Behavior. 98: 243-263. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009  0.48
2015 Agranov M, Palfrey TR. Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study Journal of Public Economics. 130: 45-58. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008  0.48
2014 Battaglini M, Nunnari S, Palfrey TR. Dynamic free riding with irreversible investments American Economic Review. 104: 2858-2871. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.9.2858  0.48
2014 Großer J, Palfrey TR. Candidate entry and political polarization: An antimedian voter theorem American Journal of Political Science. 58: 127-143. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12032  0.48
2012 Palfrey TR, Wang SW. Speculative overpricing in asset markets with information flows Econometrica. 80: 1937-1976. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8781  0.48
2012 Casella A, Llorente-Saguer A, Palfrey TR. Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes Journal of Political Economy. 120: 593-658. DOI: 10.1086/667988  0.48
2012 Battaglini M, Nunnari S, Palfrey TR. Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment American Political Science Review. 106: 407-429. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055412000160  0.48
2012 Brocas I, Carrillo JD, Palfrey TR. Information gatekeepers: Theory and experimental evidence Economic Theory. 51: 649-676. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9  0.48
2012 Battaglini M, Palfrey TR. The dynamics of distributive politics Economic Theory. 49: 739-777. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0612-z  0.48
2011 Carrillo JD, Palfrey TR. No trade Games and Economic Behavior. 71: 66-87. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006  0.48
2010 Battaglini M, Morton RB, Palfrey TR. The swing voter's curse in the laboratory Review of Economic Studies. 77: 61-89. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x  0.48
2009 Palfrey TR. Laboratory experiments in political economy Annual Review of Political Science. 12: 379-388. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139  0.48
2009 Rogers BW, Palfrey TR, Camerer CF. Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies Journal of Economic Theory. 144: 1440-1467. DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010  0.48
2009 Palfrey TR, Wang SW. On eliciting beliefs in strategic games Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 71: 98-109. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025  0.48
2008 Battaglini M, Morton RB, Palfrey TR. Information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections American Economic Review. 98: 194-200. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.194  0.48
2008 Ali SN, Goeree JK, Kartik N, Palfrey TR. Information aggregation in standing and Ad Hoc committees American Economic Review. 98: 181-186. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.181  0.48
2008 Palfrey TR. Laboratory Experiments The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0051  0.48
2008 McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. Chapter 60 Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. 1: 541-548. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00060-1  0.48
2008 Palfrey TR, Pevnitskaya S. Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 66: 731-747. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.005  0.48
2007 Goeree JK, Palfrey TR, Rogers BW, McKelvey RD. Self-correcting information cascades Review of Economic Studies. 74: 733-762. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x  0.48
2007 Levine DK, Palfrey TR. The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study American Political Science Review. 101: 143-158. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055407070013  0.48
2007 Ledyard JO, Palfrey TR. A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments Journal of Economic Theory. 133: 441-466. DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006  0.48
2006 Crémer J, Palfrey TR. An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities Journal of Public Economics. 90: 2091-2106. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.002  0.48
2006 Casella A, Gelman A, Palfrey TR. An experimental study of storable votes Games and Economic Behavior. 57: 123-154. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004  0.48
2006 Goeree JK, Palfrey TR, Rogers BW. Social learning with private and common values Economic Theory. 28: 245-264. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5  0.48
2005 Gailmard S, Palfrey TR. An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods Journal of Public Economics. 89: 1361-1398. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.002  0.48
2005 Palfrey TR. Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey Games and Economic Behavior. 51: 237-242. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.002  0.48
2005 Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR. Regular quantal response equilibrium Experimental Economics. 8: 347-367. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7  0.48
2004 Aragones E, Palfrey TR. The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study American Political Science Review. 98: 77-90.  0.48
2003 Laussel D, Palfrey TR. Efficient equilibria in the voluntary contributions mechanism with private information Journal of Public Economic Theory. 5: 449-478. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00143  0.48
2003 Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR. Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games Games and Economic Behavior. 45: 97-113. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00052-6  0.48
2002 Palfrey TR. Chapter 61 Implementation theory Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. 3: 2271-2326. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2  0.48
2002 Ledyard JO, Palfrey TR. The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes Journal of Public Economics. 83: 153-171. DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4  0.48
2002 Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR. Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 104: 247-272. DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914  0.48
2002 Aragones E, Palfrey TR. Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate Journal of Economic Theory. 103: 131-161. DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2821  0.48
2002 Crémer J, Palfrey TR. Federal mandates with local agenda setters Review of Economic Design. 7: 279-296.  0.48
2001 Jackson MO, Palfrey TR. Voluntary Implementation Journal of Economic Theory. 98: 1-25. DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2752  0.48
2000 Cremer J, Palfrey TR. Federal mandates by popular demand Journal of Political Economy. 108: 905-927. DOI: 10.1086/317669  0.48
2000 Erikson RS, Palfrey TR. Equilibria in campaign spending games: Theory and data American Political Science Review. 94: 595-609.  0.48
2000 McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR, Weber RA. The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2×2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 42: 523-548.  0.48
2000 Guarnaschelli S, McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. An experimental study of jury decision rules American Political Science Review. 94: 407-423.  0.48
1999 Ledyard JO, Palfrey TR. A characterization of interim efficiency with public goods Econometrica. 67: 435-448.  0.48
1999 Crémer J, Palfrey TR. Political confederation American Political Science Review. 93: 69-83.  0.48
1998 Jackson MO, Palfrey TR. Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining Econometrica. 66: 1353-1388.  0.48
1998 Erikson RS, Palfrey TR. Campaign spending and incumbency: An alternative simultaneous equations approach Journal of Politics. 60: 355-373.  0.48
1997 Palfrey TR, Prisbrey JE. Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why? American Economic Review. 87: 829-846.  0.48
1996 Palfrey TR, Prisbrey JE. Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments Journal of Public Economics. 61: 409-427. DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2  0.48
1996 Crémer J, Palfrey TR. In or out?: Centralization by majority vote European Economic Review. 40: 43-60. DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4  0.48
1996 El-Gamal MA, Palfrey TR. Economical experiments: Bayesian efficient experimental design International Journal of Game Theory. 25: 495-517.  0.48
1996 Fey M, McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games 1 International Journal of Game Theory. 25: 269-287.  0.48
1996 Mckelvey RD, Palfrey TR. A statistical theory of equilibrium in games Japanese Economic Review. 47: 186-209.  0.48
1995 El-Gamal MA, Palfrey TR. Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games Games and Economic Behavior. 8: 322-348. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80004-1  0.48
1995 Cramton PC, Palfrey TR. Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement Games and Economic Behavior. 10: 255-283. DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1032  0.48
1995 McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games Games and Economic Behavior. 10: 6-38. DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1023  0.48
1995 Ledyard JO, Palfrey TR. Introduction Games and Economic Behavior. 10: 1-5. DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1022  0.48
1994 Ledyard JO, Palfrey TR. Voting and lottery drafts as efficient public goods mechanisms Review of Economic Studies. 61: 327-355. DOI: 10.2307/2297984  0.48
1994 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. Repeated play, cooperation and coordination: An experimental study Review of Economic Studies. 61: 545-565. DOI: 10.2307/2297903  0.48
1994 El-Gamal MA, McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. Learning in experimental games Economic Theory. 4: 901-922. DOI: 10.1007/BF01213818  0.48
1994 Jackson MO, Palfrey TR, Srivastava S. Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms Games and Economic Behavior. 6: 474-501. DOI: 10.1006/game.1994.1028  0.48
1993 Ei-Gamal MA, Mckelvey RD, Palfrey TR. Computational issues in the statistical design and analysis of experimental games International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications. 7: 189-200. DOI: 10.1177/109434209300700302  0.48
1993 El-Gamal MA, McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. A Bayesian sequential experimental study of learning in games Journal of the American Statistical Association. 88: 428-435. DOI: 10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292  0.48
1991 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information Games and Economic Behavior. 3: 183-220. DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7  0.48
1991 Palfrey TR, Srivastava S. Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication Journal of Economic Theory. 55: 17-40. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-B  0.48
1988 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. Private incentives in social dilemmas. The effects of incomplete information and altruism Journal of Public Economics. 35: 309-332. DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7  0.48
1987 Palfrey TR, Srivastava S. On Bayesian Implementable Allocations Review of Economic Studies. 54: 175-192. DOI: 10.2307/2297510  0.48
1987 Hansen S, Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect Public Choice. 52: 15-33. DOI: 10.1007/BF00116941  0.48
1986 Palfrey TR, Srivastava S. Private information in large economies Journal of Economic Theory. 39: 34-58. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0  0.48
1986 Palfrey TR. Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle Public Choice. 50: 211-219. DOI: 10.1007/BF00124933  0.48
1985 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty American Political Science Review. 79: 62-78. DOI: 10.2307/1956119  0.48
1985 Coughlin PJ, Palfrey TR. Pareto optimality in spatial voting models Social Choice and Welfare. 1: 307-319. DOI: 10.1007/BF00649266  0.48
1984 Palfrey TR. Spatial equilibrium with entry Review of Economic Studies. 51: 139-156. DOI: 10.2307/2297710  0.48
1984 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis Journal of Public Economics. 24: 171-193. DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9  0.48
1983 Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H. A strategic calculus of voting Public Choice. 41: 7-53. DOI: 10.1007/BF00124048  0.48
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