| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2020 |
Lange M. Putting explanation back into “inference to the best explanation” NoûS. DOI: 10.1111/Nous.12349 |
0.309 |
|
| 2019 |
Lange M. The principle of virtual work, counterfactuals, and the avoidance of physics European Journal For Philosophy of Science. 9: 1-21. DOI: 10.1007/S13194-019-0256-6 |
0.396 |
|
| 2019 |
Lange M. Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation Synthese. 1-26. DOI: 10.1007/S11229-019-02317-3 |
0.372 |
|
| 2018 |
Lange M. A reply to Craver and Povich on the directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 67: 85-88. PMID 29458950 DOI: 10.1016/J.Shpsa.2018.01.002 |
0.307 |
|
| 2018 |
Lange M. Transitivity, self-explanation, and the explanatory circularity argument against Humean accounts of natural law Synthese. 195: 1337-1353. DOI: 10.1007/S11229-016-1274-Y |
0.35 |
|
| 2018 |
Lange M. Mathematical Explanations that are Not Proofs Erkenntnis. 83: 1285-1302. DOI: 10.1007/S10670-017-9941-Z |
0.367 |
|
| 2017 |
Hofweber T, Lange M. Fine's Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity NoûS. 51: 871-883. DOI: 10.1111/Nous.12150 |
0.381 |
|
| 2016 |
Lange M. Explanatory Proofs and Beautiful Proofs Journal of Humanistic Mathematics. 6: 8-51. DOI: 10.5642/Jhummath.201601.04 |
0.379 |
|
| 2015 |
Lange M. Comments on Kment's Modality and Explanatory Reasoning Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 91: 508-515. DOI: 10.1111/Phpr.12212 |
0.316 |
|
| 2015 |
Lange M. Explanation, Existence and Natural Properties in Mathematics – A Case Study: Desargues’ Theorem Dialectica. 69: 435-472. DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12120 |
0.33 |
|
| 2015 |
Lange M. Depth and Explanation in Mathematics Philosophia Mathematica. 23: 196-214. DOI: 10.1093/Philmat/Nku022 |
0.372 |
|
| 2015 |
Lange M. On “Minimal Model Explanations”: A Reply to Batterman and Rice Philosophy of Science. 82: 292-305. DOI: 10.1086/680488 |
0.327 |
|
| 2014 |
Lange M. Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience The Philosophical Review. 123: 485-531. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2749730 |
0.4 |
|
| 2014 |
Lange M. Did Einstein Really Believe that Principle Theories are Explanatorily Powerless Perspectives On Science. 22: 449-463. DOI: 10.1162/Posc_A_00145 |
0.332 |
|
| 2013 |
Lange M. What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science. 64: 485-511. DOI: 10.1093/Bjps/Axs012 |
0.452 |
|
| 2013 |
Lange M. Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws Philosophical Studies. 164: 255-261. DOI: 10.1007/S11098-012-0001-X |
0.451 |
|
| 2011 |
Lange M. Why do forces add vectorially? A forgotten controversy in the foundations of classical mechanics American Journal of Physics. 79: 380-388. DOI: 10.1119/1.3534836 |
0.365 |
|
| 2011 |
Lange M. Meta-laws of nature and the Best System Account Analysis. 71: 216-222. DOI: 10.1093/Analys/Anr011 |
0.401 |
|
| 2011 |
Lange M. Conservation Laws in Scientific Explanations: Constraints or Coincidences?* Philosophy of Science. 78: 333-352. DOI: 10.1086/660299 |
0.402 |
|
| 2011 |
Lange M, Rosenberg A. Can There be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 89: 591-599. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2011.598175 |
0.353 |
|
| 2010 |
Lange M. Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties The Philosophical Review. 119: 97-99. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2009-027 |
0.387 |
|
| 2010 |
Lange M. What Are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter) Mind. 119: 307-340. DOI: 10.1093/Mind/Fzq013 |
0.362 |
|
| 2009 |
Lange M. Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics be Complete Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 78: 312-345. DOI: 10.1111/J.1933-1592.2009.00246.X |
0.445 |
|
| 2009 |
Lange M. A Tale of Two Vectors Dialectica. 63: 397-431. DOI: 10.1111/J.1746-8361.2009.01207.X |
0.427 |
|
| 2009 |
Lange M. Why proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory Analysis. 69: 203-211. DOI: 10.1093/Analys/Anp002 |
0.444 |
|
| 2008 |
Lange M. Why contingent facts cannot necessities make Analysis. 68: 120-128. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-8284.2007.00726.X |
0.339 |
|
| 2008 |
Lange M. Could the Laws of Nature Change Philosophy of Science. 75: 69-92. DOI: 10.1086/587823 |
0.401 |
|
| 2007 |
Lange M. Laws and Meta-Laws of Nature The Harvard Review of Philosophy. 15: 21-36. DOI: 10.5840/Harvardreview20071512 |
0.395 |
|
| 2007 |
Lange M. Laws and meta-laws of nature: Conservation laws and symmetries Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 38: 457-481. DOI: 10.1016/J.Shpsb.2006.08.003 |
0.43 |
|
| 2006 |
Lange M. How to Account for the Relation between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws Mind. 115: 917-946. DOI: 10.1093/Mind/Fzl917 |
0.44 |
|
| 2006 |
Lange M. Do chances receive equal treatment under the laws? Or : Must chances be probabilities? The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science. 57: 383-403. DOI: 10.1093/Bjps/Axl005 |
0.404 |
|
| 2006 |
Lange M. Laws in nature, Stephen Mumford. Routledge, London (2004), pp. xvi+230, Price £65 hardback, ISBN: 0-415-311-284 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 37: 361-369. DOI: 10.1016/J.Shpsa.2006.03.006 |
0.342 |
|
| 2005 |
Lange M. How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role The Philosophical Review. 114: 433-468. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-114-4-433 |
0.319 |
|
| 2005 |
Lange M. Ecological laws: what would they be and why would they matter? Oikos. 110: 394-403. DOI: 10.1111/J.0030-1299.2005.14110.X |
0.41 |
|
| 2005 |
Lange M. Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on essentialism, laws, and counterfactuals Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 83: 581-588. DOI: 10.1080/00048400500338971 |
0.348 |
|
| 2005 |
Lange M. laws and their stability Synthese. 144: 415-432. DOI: 10.1007/S11229-005-5874-1 |
0.411 |
|
| 2005 |
Lange M. A counterfactual analysis of the concepts of logical truth and necessity Philosophical Studies. 125: 277-303. DOI: 10.1007/S11098-005-7774-0 |
0.352 |
|
| 2004 |
Lange M. Would direct realism resolve the classical problem of induction NoûS. 38: 197-232. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0068.2004.00468.X |
0.37 |
|
| 2004 |
Lange M. Bayesianism and Unification: A Reply to Wayne Myrvold* Philosophy of Science. 71: 205-215. DOI: 10.1086/383012 |
0.34 |
|
| 2004 |
Lange M. A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 82: 227-241. DOI: 10.1080/713659835 |
0.43 |
|
| 2004 |
Lange M. The autonomy of functional biology: a reply to Rosenberg Biology and Philosophy. 19: 93-109. DOI: 10.1023/B:Biph.0000013247.44628.02 |
0.402 |
|
| 2002 |
Lange M. Okasha on Inductive Scepticism The Philosophical Quarterly. 52: 226-232. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00264 |
0.39 |
|
| 2002 |
Lange M. Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy Analysis. 62: 281-285. DOI: 10.1093/Analys/62.4.281 |
0.305 |
|
| 2002 |
Lange M. Who’s Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them Erkenntnis. 57: 407-423. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_7 |
0.444 |
|
| 1999 |
Lange M. Why Are the Laws of Nature So Important to Science Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59: 625. DOI: 10.2307/2653785 |
0.408 |
|
| 1999 |
Lange M. Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood Philosophy of Science. 66: 243-267. DOI: 10.1086/392686 |
0.413 |
|
| 1996 |
Lange M. Laws of nature, cosmic coincidences and scientific realism Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74: 614-638. DOI: 10.1080/00048409612347561 |
0.421 |
|
| 1995 |
Lange M. Spearman's Principle The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science. 46: 503-521. DOI: 10.1093/Bjps/46.4.503 |
0.353 |
|
| 1993 |
Lange M. When would Natural Laws have been Broken Analysis. 53: 262-269. DOI: 10.1093/Analys/53.4.262 |
0.327 |
|
| 1993 |
Lange M. Natural laws and the problem of provisos Erkenntnis. 38: 233-248. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01128982 |
0.436 |
|
| 1988 |
Lange M. Hui Shih's Logical Theory of Descriptions: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Hui Shih's Ten Enigmatic Arguments Monumenta Serica. 38: 95-114. DOI: 10.1080/02549948.1988.11731202 |
0.335 |
|
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