Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Ph.D. - Publications
Affiliations: | Computer Science | University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA | |
2009 | University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States |
Area:
machine learning, learning theory, algorithmic economics, and social computingYear | Citation | Score | |||
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2019 | Hu L, Immorlica N, Vaughan JW. The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation Arxiv: Learning. 259-268. DOI: 10.1145/3287560.3287597 | 0.333 | |||
2016 | Ho CJ, Slivkins A, Vaughan JW. Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 55: 317-359. DOI: 10.1613/Jair.4940 | 0.416 | |||
2016 | Chen Y, Ghosh A, Kearns M, Roughgarden T, Vaughan JW. Mathematical foundations for social computing Communications of the Acm. 59: 102-108. DOI: 10.1145/2960403 | 0.447 | |||
2016 | Ho C, Slivkins A, Suri S, Vaughan JW. Incentivizing high quality crowdwork Acm Sigecom Exchanges. 14: 26-34. DOI: 10.1145/2904104.2904108 | 0.48 | |||
2014 | Slivkins A, Vaughan JW. Online decision making in crowdsourcing markets: theoretical challenges Sigecom Exchanges. 12: 4-23. DOI: 10.1145/2692359.2692364 | 0.411 | |||
2014 | Mason W, Vaughan JW, Wallach H. Computational social science and social computing Machine Learning. 95: 257-260. DOI: 10.1007/S10994-013-5426-8 | 0.362 | |||
2012 | Ho CJ, Zhang Y, Vaughan JW, Van Der Schaar M. Towards social norm design for crowdsourcing markets Aaai Workshop - Technical Report. 94-100. | 0.301 | |||
2012 | Ho CJ, Vaughan JW. Online task assignment in crowdsourcing markets Proceedings of the National Conference On Artificial Intelligence. 1: 45-51. | 0.329 | |||
2010 | Chen Y, Vaughan JW. Connections between markets and learning Sigecom Exchanges. 9: 6. DOI: 10.1145/1980534.1980540 | 0.308 | |||
2010 | Ganchev K, Nevmyvaka Y, Kearns M, Vaughan JW. Censored exploration and the dark pool problem Communications of the Acm. 53: 99-107. DOI: 10.1145/1735223.1735247 | 0.472 | |||
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