| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2013 |
Fodor JA. Précis of The Modularity of Mind Readings in Cognitive Science: a Perspective From Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. 73-77. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0001921X |
0.333 |
|
| 2007 |
Connolly AC, Fodor JA, Gleitman LR, Gleitman H. Why stereotypes don't even make good defaults. Cognition. 103: 1-22. PMID 16616076 DOI: 10.1016/J.Cognition.2006.02.005 |
0.331 |
|
| 2004 |
Fodor J. Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century Mind & Language. 19: 29-47. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0017.2004.00245.X |
0.315 |
|
| 2001 |
Fodor J, Lepore E. Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63: 465-481. DOI: 10.1111/J.1933-1592.2001.Tb00119.X |
0.346 |
|
| 2001 |
Fodor J, Lepore E. Why Compositionality Won’t Go Away: Reflections on Horwich’s ‘Deflationary’ Theory Ratio. 14: 350-368. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00169 |
0.378 |
|
| 2001 |
Fodor JA. Language, thought and compositionality Mind and Language. 16: 1-15. DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100010808 |
0.308 |
|
| 1998 |
Fodor JA, Lepore E. The Emptiness of the Lexicon: Reflections on James Pustejovsky's The Generative Lexicon Linguistic Inquiry. 29: 269-288. DOI: 10.1162/002438998553743 |
0.322 |
|
| 1997 |
Fodor JA. The representational theory of mind American Behavioral Scientist. 829-841. DOI: 10.1177/0002764297040006010 |
0.346 |
|
| 1996 |
Fodor J, Lepore E. The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes Cognition. 58: 253-270. PMID 8820389 DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(95)00694-X |
0.324 |
|
| 1996 |
Fodor J. Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin Mind & Language. 11: 246-262. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0017.1996.Tb00045.X |
0.312 |
|
| 1995 |
Fodor JA. The elm and the expert : mentalese and its semantics Language. 71: 820. DOI: 10.7551/Mitpress/2693.001.0001 |
0.397 |
|
| 1994 |
Fodor J. Concepts: a potboiler Cognition. 50: 95-113. PMID 8039378 DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90023-X |
0.329 |
|
| 1994 |
Fodor J, Lepore E. Is Radical Interpretation Possible? Philosophical Perspectives. 8: 101. DOI: 10.2307/2214165 |
0.333 |
|
| 1994 |
Fodor J, Lepore E. What Is The Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 54: 837. DOI: 10.2307/2108414 |
0.356 |
|
| 1993 |
Segal EM, Williams M, Cole DJ, Geller J, Wilks Y, Loeb S, Sterelny K, Fodor J, Hein�maa S, Marras A. Book reviews Minds and Machines. 3: 335-375. DOI: 10.1007/BF00976286 |
0.481 |
|
| 1991 |
Fodor JA. The dogma that didn't bark (a fragment of a naturalized epistemology) Mind. 100: 201-220. DOI: 10.1093/Mind/C.398.201 |
0.3 |
|
| 1991 |
Fodor JA. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal; hedged laws and psychological explanations Mind. 100: 19-34. DOI: 10.1093/Mind/C.397.19 |
0.303 |
|
| 1990 |
Fodor J, McLaughlin BP. Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: why Smolensky's solution doesn't work. Cognition. 35: 183-204. PMID 2354612 DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(90)90014-B |
0.325 |
|
| 1988 |
Fodor JA, Pylyshyn ZW. Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis. Cognition. 28: 3-71. PMID 2450716 DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 |
0.318 |
|
| 1988 |
Fodor JA. A Reply to Churchland's "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" Philosophy of Science. 55: 188-198. DOI: 10.1086/289426 |
0.353 |
|
| 1984 |
Fodor JA. Semantics, Wisconsin style Synthese. 59: 231-250. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1882-5_7 |
0.345 |
|
| 1980 |
Churchland PS, Fodor JA. The Language of Thought NoûS. 14: 120. DOI: 10.2307/2214900 |
0.342 |
|
| 1980 |
Fodor JA. Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3: 63-109. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00001771 |
0.35 |
|
| 1979 |
Cutler A, Fodor JA. Semantic focus and sentence comprehension. Cognition. 7: 49-59. PMID 436402 DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(79)90010-6 |
0.336 |
|
| 1976 |
Pisoni DB, Fodor JA, Bever TG, Garrett MF. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar Language. 52: 682. DOI: 10.2307/412725 |
0.357 |
|
| 1974 |
Clair RS, Fodor JA, Bever TG, Garret MF. The Psychology of Language The Modern Language Journal. 58: 354. DOI: 10.2307/325153 |
0.354 |
|
| 1972 |
Block N, Fodor JA. What psychological states are not The Philosophical Review. 81: 159. DOI: 10.2307/2183991 |
0.472 |
|
| 1972 |
Fodor J. Some reflections on L.S. Vygotsky's thought and language Cognition. 1: 83-95. DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(72)90046-7 |
0.318 |
|
| 1971 |
Fodor JA, Shaffer JA. Philosophy of mind The Philosophical Review. 80: 104. DOI: 10.2307/2184316 |
0.305 |
|
| 1970 |
Fodor JA. Troubles about actions Synthese. 21: 298-319. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00484802 |
0.358 |
|
| 1967 |
Bar-Hillel Y, Fodor JA, Katz JJ. The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language Language. 43: 526. DOI: 10.2307/411551 |
0.552 |
|
| 1966 |
Cohen LJ, Fodor JA, Katz JJ. The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language The Philosophical Quarterly. 16: 165. DOI: 10.2307/2218453 |
0.552 |
|
| 1965 |
Bever TG, Fodor JA, Weksel W. Is linguistics empirical? Psychological Review. 72: 493-500. PMID 5852244 DOI: 10.1037/H0022698 |
0.358 |
|
| 1965 |
Fodor JA, Carroll JB. Language and Thought The Modern Language Journal. 49: 384. DOI: 10.2307/322944 |
0.342 |
|
| 1964 |
Katz JJ, Fodor JA. A Reply to Dixon’S “A Trend in Semantics” Linguistics. 2: 19-29. DOI: 10.1515/Ling.1964.2.3.19 |
0.449 |
|
| 1964 |
Fodor JA. On knowing what we would say The Philosophical Review. 73: 297-308. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15426-5_18 |
0.351 |
|
| 1963 |
Katz JJ, Fodor JA. The structure of a semantic theory Language. 39: 170-210. DOI: 10.2307/411200 |
0.533 |
|
| 1963 |
Fodor JA, Katz JJ. The availability of what we say The Philosophical Review. 72: 190-203. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15426-5_11 |
0.566 |
|
| 1962 |
Katz J, Fodor J. What's wrong with the philosophy of Language? 1 Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines. 5: 269-283. DOI: 10.1080/00201746208601351 |
0.562 |
|
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