Year |
Citation |
Score |
2020 |
Sobel J. Lying and Deception in Games Journal of Political Economy. 128: 907-947. DOI: 10.1086/704754 |
0.311 |
|
2019 |
Sobel J. Iterated weak dominance and interval‐dominance supermodular games Theoretical Economics. 14: 71-102. DOI: 10.3982/Te2904 |
0.362 |
|
2018 |
Gneezy U, Kajackaite A, Sobel J. Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie American Economic Review. 108: 419-453. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20161553 |
0.31 |
|
2017 |
Sobel J. A note on pre-play communication Games and Economic Behavior. 102: 477-486. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.02.008 |
0.338 |
|
2014 |
Sobel J. On the relationship between individual and group decisions Theoretical Economics. 9: 163-185. DOI: 10.3982/Te1185 |
0.31 |
|
2011 |
Dufwenberg M, Heidhues P, Kirchsteiger G, Riedel F, Sobel J. Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium Review of Economic Studies. 78: 613-639. DOI: 10.1093/Restud/Rdq026 |
0.395 |
|
2009 |
Sobel J. Generous actors, selfish actions: Markets with other-regarding preferences International Review of Economics. 56: 3-16. DOI: 10.1007/S12232-009-0061-1 |
0.369 |
|
2008 |
Chen Y, Kartik N, Sobel J. Selecting cheap-talk equilibria Econometrica. 76: 117-136. DOI: 10.1111/J.0012-9682.2008.00819.X |
0.361 |
|
2008 |
Segal U, Sobel J. A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity International Journal of Game Theory. 36: 571-585. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-007-0085-2 |
0.36 |
|
2007 |
Segal U, Sobel J. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings Journal of Economic Theory. 136: 197-216. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.07.003 |
0.352 |
|
2006 |
Sobel J. For better or forever: Formal versus informal enforcement Journal of Labor Economics. 24: 271-297. DOI: 10.1086/499973 |
0.316 |
|
2005 |
Sobel J. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity Journal of Economic Literature. 43: 392-436. DOI: 10.1257/0022051054661530 |
0.342 |
|
2005 |
Santos-Pinto L, Sobel J. A model of positive self-image in subjective assessments American Economic Review. 95: 1386-1402. DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014245 |
0.563 |
|
2002 |
Sobel J. Putting altruism in context Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 25: 275-276. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0249005X |
0.3 |
|
2001 |
Sobel J. Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism Games and Economic Behavior. 37: 196-215. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.145788 |
0.366 |
|
2000 |
Sobel J. A Model of Declining Standards International Economic Review. 41: 295-303. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.61708 |
0.307 |
|
1999 |
Sobel J. A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 8: 33-60. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.76461 |
0.305 |
|
1996 |
Rabin M, Sobel J. Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements Journal of Economic Theory. 68: 1-25. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1996.0001 |
0.324 |
|
1995 |
Kim Y, Sobel J. An Evolutionary Approach To Pre-Play Communication Econometrica. 63: 1181-1193. DOI: 10.2307/2171726 |
0.336 |
|
1995 |
Blume A, Sobel J. Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games Journal of Economic Theory. 65: 359-382. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1995.1013 |
0.324 |
|
1994 |
Kreps DM, Sobel J. Chapter 25 Signalling Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. 2: 849-867. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80057-8 |
0.312 |
|
1993 |
Sobel J. Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem International Economic Review. 34: 259-269. DOI: 10.2307/2526911 |
0.354 |
|
1993 |
Sobel J. Evolutionary stability and efficiency Economics Letters. 42: 301-312. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90077-P |
0.323 |
|
1993 |
Blume A, Kim YG, Sobel J. Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication Games and Economic Behavior. 5: 547-575. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1993.1031 |
0.366 |
|
1991 |
Sobel J. Durable Goods Monopoly With Entry Of New Consumers Econometrica. 59: 1455-1485. DOI: 10.2307/2938375 |
0.323 |
|
1991 |
Emons W, Sobel J. On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical The Review of Economic Studies. 58: 375-390. DOI: 10.2307/2297973 |
0.32 |
|
1990 |
Sobel J, Stole L, Zapater I. Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games Journal of Economic Theory. 52: 304-331. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90035-I |
0.367 |
|
1990 |
Cho I, Sobel J. Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games Journal of Economic Theory. 50: 381-413. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9 |
0.326 |
|
1987 |
Border KC, Sobel J. Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder The Review of Economic Studies. 54: 525-540. DOI: 10.2307/2297481 |
0.323 |
|
1987 |
Banks JS, Sobel J. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games Econometrica. 55: 647-661. DOI: 10.2307/1913604 |
0.353 |
|
1985 |
Sobel J. A Theory of Credibility The Review of Economic Studies. 52: 557-573. DOI: 10.2307/2297732 |
0.322 |
|
1984 |
Sobel J. The timing of sales Review of Economic Studies. 51: 353-368. DOI: 10.2307/2297428 |
0.301 |
|
1984 |
Sobel J. Non-linear prices and price-taking behavior Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 5: 387-396. DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(84)90008-8 |
0.306 |
|
1983 |
Sobel J, Takahashi I. A Multistage Model of Bargaining The Review of Economic Studies. 50: 411-426. DOI: 10.2307/2297673 |
0.334 |
|
1982 |
Crawford VP, Sobel J. Strategic Information Transmission Econometrica. 50: 1431-1451. DOI: 10.2307/1913390 |
0.348 |
|
1982 |
Gale D, Sobel J. On optimal distribution of output from a jointly owned resource Journal of Mathematical Economics. 9: 51-59. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90016-7 |
0.312 |
|
1981 |
Sobel J. Proportional distribution schemes Journal of Mathematical Economics. 8: 147-157. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(81)90018-5 |
0.319 |
|
1979 |
Sobel J. Fair allocations of a renewable resource Journal of Economic Theory. 21: 235-248. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90029-2 |
0.319 |
|
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