Joel Sobel - Publications

Affiliations: 
Economics University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 
Area:
Theory Economics

38 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2020 Sobel J. Lying and Deception in Games Journal of Political Economy. 128: 907-947. DOI: 10.1086/704754  0.311
2019 Sobel J. Iterated weak dominance and interval‐dominance supermodular games Theoretical Economics. 14: 71-102. DOI: 10.3982/Te2904  0.362
2018 Gneezy U, Kajackaite A, Sobel J. Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie American Economic Review. 108: 419-453. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20161553  0.31
2017 Sobel J. A note on pre-play communication Games and Economic Behavior. 102: 477-486. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.02.008  0.338
2014 Sobel J. On the relationship between individual and group decisions Theoretical Economics. 9: 163-185. DOI: 10.3982/Te1185  0.31
2011 Dufwenberg M, Heidhues P, Kirchsteiger G, Riedel F, Sobel J. Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium Review of Economic Studies. 78: 613-639. DOI: 10.1093/Restud/Rdq026  0.395
2009 Sobel J. Generous actors, selfish actions: Markets with other-regarding preferences International Review of Economics. 56: 3-16. DOI: 10.1007/S12232-009-0061-1  0.369
2008 Chen Y, Kartik N, Sobel J. Selecting cheap-talk equilibria Econometrica. 76: 117-136. DOI: 10.1111/J.0012-9682.2008.00819.X  0.361
2008 Segal U, Sobel J. A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity International Journal of Game Theory. 36: 571-585. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-007-0085-2  0.36
2007 Segal U, Sobel J. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings Journal of Economic Theory. 136: 197-216. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.07.003  0.352
2006 Sobel J. For better or forever: Formal versus informal enforcement Journal of Labor Economics. 24: 271-297. DOI: 10.1086/499973  0.316
2005 Sobel J. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity Journal of Economic Literature. 43: 392-436. DOI: 10.1257/0022051054661530  0.342
2005 Santos-Pinto L, Sobel J. A model of positive self-image in subjective assessments American Economic Review. 95: 1386-1402. DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014245  0.563
2002 Sobel J. Putting altruism in context Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 25: 275-276. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0249005X  0.3
2001 Sobel J. Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism Games and Economic Behavior. 37: 196-215. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.145788  0.366
2000 Sobel J. A Model of Declining Standards International Economic Review. 41: 295-303. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.61708  0.307
1999 Sobel J. A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 8: 33-60. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.76461  0.305
1996 Rabin M, Sobel J. Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements Journal of Economic Theory. 68: 1-25. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1996.0001  0.324
1995 Kim Y, Sobel J. An Evolutionary Approach To Pre-Play Communication Econometrica. 63: 1181-1193. DOI: 10.2307/2171726  0.336
1995 Blume A, Sobel J. Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games Journal of Economic Theory. 65: 359-382. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1995.1013  0.324
1994 Kreps DM, Sobel J. Chapter 25 Signalling Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. 2: 849-867. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80057-8  0.312
1993 Sobel J. Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem International Economic Review. 34: 259-269. DOI: 10.2307/2526911  0.354
1993 Sobel J. Evolutionary stability and efficiency Economics Letters. 42: 301-312. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90077-P  0.323
1993 Blume A, Kim YG, Sobel J. Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication Games and Economic Behavior. 5: 547-575. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1993.1031  0.366
1991 Sobel J. Durable Goods Monopoly With Entry Of New Consumers Econometrica. 59: 1455-1485. DOI: 10.2307/2938375  0.323
1991 Emons W, Sobel J. On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical The Review of Economic Studies. 58: 375-390. DOI: 10.2307/2297973  0.32
1990 Sobel J, Stole L, Zapater I. Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games Journal of Economic Theory. 52: 304-331. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90035-I  0.367
1990 Cho I, Sobel J. Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games Journal of Economic Theory. 50: 381-413. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9  0.326
1987 Border KC, Sobel J. Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder The Review of Economic Studies. 54: 525-540. DOI: 10.2307/2297481  0.323
1987 Banks JS, Sobel J. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games Econometrica. 55: 647-661. DOI: 10.2307/1913604  0.353
1985 Sobel J. A Theory of Credibility The Review of Economic Studies. 52: 557-573. DOI: 10.2307/2297732  0.322
1984 Sobel J. The timing of sales Review of Economic Studies. 51: 353-368. DOI: 10.2307/2297428  0.301
1984 Sobel J. Non-linear prices and price-taking behavior Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 5: 387-396. DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(84)90008-8  0.306
1983 Sobel J, Takahashi I. A Multistage Model of Bargaining The Review of Economic Studies. 50: 411-426. DOI: 10.2307/2297673  0.334
1982 Crawford VP, Sobel J. Strategic Information Transmission Econometrica. 50: 1431-1451. DOI: 10.2307/1913390  0.348
1982 Gale D, Sobel J. On optimal distribution of output from a jointly owned resource Journal of Mathematical Economics. 9: 51-59. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90016-7  0.312
1981 Sobel J. Proportional distribution schemes Journal of Mathematical Economics. 8: 147-157. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(81)90018-5  0.319
1979 Sobel J. Fair allocations of a renewable resource Journal of Economic Theory. 21: 235-248. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90029-2  0.319
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