Year |
Citation |
Score |
2019 |
Austen-Smith D, Dziuda W, Harstad BG, Loeper A. Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments Theoretical Economics. 14: 1483-1534. DOI: 10.3982/Te3329 |
0.425 |
|
2015 |
Austen-Smith D. Jon Elster's Securities against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections: A Review Essay Journal of Economic Literature. 53: 65-78. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.53.1.65 |
0.392 |
|
2009 |
Austen-Smith D, Feddersen TJ. Information aggregation and communication in committees. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 364: 763-9. PMID 19073484 DOI: 10.1098/Rstb.2008.0256 |
0.473 |
|
2008 |
Austen-Smith D. Economic Methods in Positive Political Theory The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0050 |
0.305 |
|
2008 |
Austen-Smith D, Feddersen TJ. In response to Jurg Steiner's concept stretching: The case of deliberation European Political Science. 7: 191-193. DOI: 10.1057/Palgrave.Eps.2210187 |
0.384 |
|
2008 |
Austen-Smith D, Wallerstein M. Redistribution and affirmative action Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein: the Political Economy of Inequality, Unions, and Social Democracy. 320-366. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jpubeco.2006.05.005 |
0.424 |
|
2006 |
Austen-Smith D, Feddersen TJ. Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules American Political Science Review. 100: 209-217. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055406062113 |
0.478 |
|
2005 |
Austen-Smith D, Fryer RG. An Economic Analysis of “Acting White” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 120: 551-583. DOI: 10.1093/Qje/120.2.551 |
0.312 |
|
2003 |
Austen-Smith D. Majority preference for subsidies over redistribution Journal of Public Economics. 87: 1617-1640. DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00013-0 |
0.421 |
|
2002 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence European Journal of Political Economy. 18: 263-280. DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0 |
0.406 |
|
2002 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS, Rustichini A. Introduction to political science Journal of Economic Theory. 103: 1-10. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.2001.2879 |
0.342 |
|
2000 |
Austen-Smith D. Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation Journal of Political Economy. 108: 1235-1269. DOI: 10.1086/317680 |
0.474 |
|
2000 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Cheap Talk and Burned Money Journal of Economic Theory. 91: 1-16. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1999.2591 |
0.364 |
|
1999 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model Social Choice and Welfare. 16: 663-672. DOI: 10.1007/S003550050167 |
0.34 |
|
1998 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 259-287. DOI: 10.1146/Annurev.Polisci.1.1.259 |
0.407 |
|
1998 |
Austen-Smith D. Allocating access for information and contributions Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 14: 277-303. DOI: 10.1093/Jleo/14.2.277 |
0.515 |
|
1996 |
Austen-Smith D, Wright JR. Theory and evidence for counteractive lobbying American Journal of Political Science. 40: 543-564. DOI: 10.2307/2111637 |
0.398 |
|
1996 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem American Political Science Review. 90: 34-45. DOI: 10.2307/2082796 |
0.43 |
|
1995 |
Austen-Smith D. Campaign contributions and access American Political Science Review. 89: 566-581. DOI: 10.2307/2082974 |
0.498 |
|
1994 |
Austen-Smith D. Strategic transmission of costly information Econometrica. 62: 955-963. DOI: 10.2307/2951741 |
0.431 |
|
1993 |
Austen-Smith D. Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes American Journal of Political Science. 37: 799. DOI: 10.2307/2111575 |
0.367 |
|
1993 |
Austen-Smith D. Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule Games and Economic Behavior. 5: 3-43. DOI: 10.1006/Game.1993.1002 |
0.48 |
|
1992 |
Austen-Smith D. Explaining the vote: Constituency constraints on sophisticated voting American Journal of Political Science. 36: 68. DOI: 10.2307/2111425 |
0.529 |
|
1992 |
Austen-Smith D. Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making International Political Science Review. 13: 45-58. DOI: 10.1177/019251219201300104 |
0.475 |
|
1992 |
Austen-Smith D, Wright JR. Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote Social Choice and Welfare. 9: 229-257. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00192880 |
0.506 |
|
1991 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks J. Monotonicity in Electoral Systems American Political Science Review. 85: 531-537. DOI: 10.2307/1963173 |
0.482 |
|
1991 |
Austen-Smith D. Rational Consumers And Irrational Voters: A Review Essay On Black Hole Tariffs And Endogenous Policy Theory, By Stephen Magee, William Brock And Leslie Young, Cambridge University Press 1989 Economics and Politics. 3: 73-92. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0343.1991.Tb00040.X |
0.387 |
|
1990 |
Austen-Smith D. Information transmission in debate American Journal of Political Science. 34: 124. DOI: 10.2307/2111513 |
0.486 |
|
1990 |
Austen-Smith D, Riker WH. Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction American Political Science Review. 84: 243-245. DOI: 10.2307/1963641 |
0.474 |
|
1990 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks J. Stable Governments And The Allocation Of Policy Portfolios American Political Science Review. 84: 891-906. DOI: 10.2307/1962771 |
0.469 |
|
1990 |
Austen-Smith D. Credible debate equilibria Social Choice and Welfare. 7: 75-93. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01832923 |
0.481 |
|
1989 |
Austen-Smith D. Sincere voting in models of legislative elections Social Choice and Welfare. 6: 287-299. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00446986 |
0.46 |
|
1988 |
Austen-Smith D, Banks JS. Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes American Political Science Review. 82: 405-422. DOI: 10.2307/1957393 |
0.439 |
|
1987 |
Austen-Smith D, Riker WH. Asymmetric Information And The Coherence Of Legislation American Political Science Review. 81: 897-918. DOI: 10.2307/1962682 |
0.486 |
|
1987 |
Austen-Smith D. Sophisticated sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas American Political Science Review. 81: 1323-1330. DOI: 10.2307/1962591 |
0.515 |
|
1987 |
Jenkins S, Austen-Smith D. Interdependent decision-making in non-profit industries. A simultaneous equation analysis of English provincial theatre International Journal of Industrial Organization. 5: 149-174. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(87)80017-6 |
0.359 |
|
1987 |
Austen-Smith D. Parties, districts and the spatial theory of elections Social Choice and Welfare. 4: 9-23. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00433952 |
0.456 |
|
1987 |
Austen-Smith D. Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting Public Choice. 54: 123-139. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00123002 |
0.463 |
|
1986 |
Austen-Smith D. Legislative coalitions and electoral equilibrium Public Choice. 50: 185-210. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00124932 |
0.4 |
|
1984 |
Austen-Smith D. Subsidies to the Arts with Multiple Public Donors Economic Record. 60: 381-389. DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-4932.1984.Tb00873.X |
0.409 |
|
1984 |
Austen-Smith D. Two-party competition with many constituences Mathematical Social Sciences. 7: 177-198. DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90004-0 |
0.471 |
|
1983 |
Austen-Smith D. The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions and information Environment &Amp; Planning C: Government &Amp; Policy. 1: 439-460. DOI: 10.1068/C010439 |
0.437 |
|
1982 |
Austen-Smith D, Hibbs DA, Fassbender H. Contemporary Political Economy. The Economic Journal. 92: 189. DOI: 10.2307/2232270 |
0.386 |
|
1982 |
Jenkins S, Austen-Smith D. Grant-giving to provincial repertory theatres by the arts council of Great Britain: A preliminary analysis Journal of Cultural Economics. 6: 57-76. DOI: 10.1007/Bf02511601 |
0.363 |
|
1981 |
Austen-Smith D. Voluntary pressure groups Economica. 48: 143-153. DOI: 10.2307/2553479 |
0.4 |
|
1981 |
Austen-Smith D. Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition Public Choice. 37: 389-402. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00133741 |
0.487 |
|
1980 |
Austen-Smith D. Individual contribution to public goods Economics Letters. 5: 359-361. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(80)90132-9 |
0.342 |
|
1980 |
Austen-Smith D. On the impact of revenue subsidies on repertory theatre policy Journal of Cultural Economics. 4: 9-17. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00240641 |
0.415 |
|
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