Year |
Citation |
Score |
2017 |
Gallego M, Schofield N. Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter Mathematical Social Sciences. 90: 160-181. DOI: 10.1016/J.Mathsocsci.2016.09.002 |
0.426 |
|
2017 |
Schofield N. Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno Frey Homo Oeconomicus. 34: 191-194. DOI: 10.1007/S41412-017-0041-8 |
0.371 |
|
2015 |
Gallego M, Schofield N. Do parties converge to the electoral mean in all political systems? Journal of Theoretical Politics. 28: 288-330. DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586878 |
0.485 |
|
2015 |
Schofield N, Caballero G. The Political Economy of Governance Springer Us. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7 |
0.447 |
|
2014 |
Galiani S, Schofield N, Torrens G. Factor Endowments, Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence Journal of Public Economic Theory. 16: 119-156. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1531953 |
0.481 |
|
2014 |
Galiani S, Schofield N, Torrens G. Factor Endowments, Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence: Factor Endowments, Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence Journal of Public Economic Theory. 16: 119-156. DOI: 10.1111/Jpet.12057 |
0.387 |
|
2014 |
Gallego M, Schofield N, McAlister K, Jeon JS. The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election Public Choice. 158: 427-463. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0109-3 |
0.612 |
|
2013 |
Gallego M, Schofield N. The convergence coefficient across political systems. Thescientificworldjournal. 2013: 653035. PMID 24385886 DOI: 10.1155/2013/653035 |
0.379 |
|
2013 |
Schofield N. The "probability of a fit choice" Review of Economic Design. 17: 129-150. DOI: 10.1007/S10058-012-0136-4 |
0.461 |
|
2013 |
Schnidman E, Schofield N. Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After. 187-227. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_11 |
0.395 |
|
2013 |
Schnidman E, Schofield N. Quandaries of gridlock and leadership in US electoral politics Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis. 2147483647: 91-127. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_5 |
0.418 |
|
2013 |
Schofield N, Demirkaya B. Spatial model of elections in Turkey: Tracing changes in the party system in the 2000s Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis. 2147483647: 317-330. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_15 |
0.401 |
|
2013 |
McAlister K, Jeon JS, Schofield N. Modeling elections with varying party bundles: Applications to the 2004 Canadian election Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis. 2147483647: 289-315. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_14 |
0.609 |
|
2011 |
Schofield N, Gallego M, Jeon J. Leaders, voters and activists in the elections in Great Britain 2005 and 2010 Electoral Studies. 30: 484-496. DOI: 10.1016/J.Electstud.2011.03.001 |
0.503 |
|
2011 |
Gallego M, Schofield N, Kilgour DM. Guest editors’ introduction to the special issue on the political economy of elections and bargaining Social Choice and Welfare. 36: 355-364. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0512-3 |
0.476 |
|
2011 |
Schofield N, Claassen C, Ozdemir U, Zakharov A. Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: Comparing the United States and Israel Social Choice and Welfare. 36: 483-518. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0507-0 |
0.454 |
|
2011 |
Schofield N, Gallego M, Ozdemir U, Zakharov A. Competition for popular support: A valence model of elections in Turkey Social Choice and Welfare. 36: 451-482. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0505-2 |
0.5 |
|
2011 |
Schofield N. Is the political economy stable or chaotic? Auco Czech Economic Review. 5: 76-93. |
0.389 |
|
2010 |
Schofield N, Claassen C, Ozdemir U, Zakharov A. Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences. 2010. DOI: 10.1155/2010/562813 |
0.482 |
|
2010 |
Schofield N, Zakharov A. A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election Public Choice. 142: 177-194. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-009-9483-2 |
0.461 |
|
2008 |
Schofield N, Levinson M. Modeling authoritarian regimes Politics, Philosophy and Economics. 7: 243-283. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X08092103 |
0.46 |
|
2008 |
Miller G, Schofield N. The transformation of the republican and democratic party coalitions in the U.S Perspectives On Politics. 6: 433-450. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592708081218 |
0.416 |
|
2008 |
Schofield N. Divergence in the spatial stochastic model of voting Power, Freedom, and Voting. 259-287. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_14 |
0.39 |
|
2007 |
Schofield N. The spatial model of politics The Spatial Model of Politics. 1-241. DOI: 10.4324/9780203073728 |
0.396 |
|
2007 |
Schofield N, Miller G. Elections and activist coalitions in the United States American Journal of Political Science. 51: 518-531. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5907.2007.00265.X |
0.482 |
|
2007 |
Schofield N. The mean voter theorem: Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium Review of Economic Studies. 74: 965-980. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00444.X |
0.542 |
|
2007 |
Schofield N, Cataife G. A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina Mathematical Social Sciences. 53: 213-231. DOI: 10.1016/J.Mathsocsci.2007.01.002 |
0.727 |
|
2007 |
Schofield N. Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty Social Choice and Welfare. 28: 461-490. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0182-3 |
0.524 |
|
2006 |
Schofield N, Sened I. Multiparty democracy: Elections and legislative politics Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics. 1-225. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511617621 |
0.434 |
|
2006 |
Schofield N. Architects of political change: Constitutional quandaries and social choice theory Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory. 1-319. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511606892 |
0.31 |
|
2006 |
Schofield N. Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists Review of Economic Design. 10: 183-203. DOI: 10.1007/S10058-006-0013-0 |
0.537 |
|
2005 |
Schofield N, Sened I. Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty? European Journal of Political Research. 44: 355-390. DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-6765.2005.00231.X |
0.55 |
|
2005 |
Schofield N, Sened I. Multiparty competition in Israel, 1988-96 British Journal of Political Science. 35: 635-663. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000335 |
0.523 |
|
2005 |
Schofield N. A valence model of political competition in Britain: 1992-1997 Electoral Studies. 24: 347-370. DOI: 10.1016/J.Electstud.2004.10.012 |
0.511 |
|
2005 |
Schofield N. The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US Republic 1785-1800 Social Choice and Welfare. 25: 303-318. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-005-0005-Y |
0.326 |
|
2004 |
Schofield N. Equilibrium in the spatial 'valence' model of politics Journal of Theoretical Politics. 16: 447-481. DOI: 10.1177/0951629804046150 |
0.522 |
|
2004 |
Schofield N. ‘The probability of a fit choice’: American political history and voting theory Justice and Democracy: Essays For Brian Barry. 59-78. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511490217.004 |
0.391 |
|
2003 |
Schofield N. Constitutional Quandaries and Critical Elections Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 2: 5-36. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X03002001422 |
0.452 |
|
2003 |
Schofield N. Valence competition in the spatial stochastic model Journal of Theoretical Politics. 15: 371-383. DOI: 10.1177/0951692803154001 |
0.435 |
|
2003 |
Schofield N, Miller G, Martin A. Critical Elections and Political Realignments in the USA: 1860–2000: Political Studies. 51: 217-240. DOI: 10.1111/1467-923X.00181-I1 |
0.502 |
|
2003 |
Miller G, Schofield N. Activists and partisan realignment in the United States American Political Science Review. 97: 245-260. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055403000650 |
0.441 |
|
2003 |
Schofield N. Power, prosperity and social choice: A review Social Choice and Welfare. 20: 85-118. DOI: 10.1007/S003550200170 |
0.358 |
|
2002 |
Schofield N. Quandaries of war and of union in North America: 1763 to 1861 Politics and Society. 30: 5-49. DOI: 10.1177/0032329202030001002 |
0.405 |
|
2002 |
Schofield N, Sened I. Local Nash equilibrium in multiparty politics Annals of Operations Research. 109: 193-211. DOI: 10.1023/A:1016304319551 |
0.48 |
|
2002 |
Schofield N. Evolution of the constitution British Journal of Political Science. 32: 1-20. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123402000017 |
0.395 |
|
2002 |
Schofield N. Chapter 9 Representative democracy as social choice Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. 1: 425-455. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0110(02)80013-3 |
0.511 |
|
2001 |
Schofield N. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. By David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 208p. $39.50. American Political Science Review. 95: 459-460. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401212027 |
0.398 |
|
2001 |
Schofield N. Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review Social Choice and Welfare. 18: 571-600. DOI: 10.1007/S003550000077 |
0.404 |
|
2000 |
Schofield N, Parks R. Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining Mathematical Social Sciences. 39: 133-174. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00027-X |
0.536 |
|
2000 |
Schofield N. Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review Social Choice and Welfare. 17: 463-479. DOI: 10.1007/S003550050173 |
0.421 |
|
2000 |
Schofield N. Constitutional political economy: On the possibility of combining rational choice theory and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science. 3: 277-303. |
0.367 |
|
1999 |
Schofield N. The heart of the Atlantic Constitution: International economic stability, 1919-1998 Politics and Society. 27: 173-215. DOI: 10.1177/0032329299027002002 |
0.338 |
|
1999 |
Schofield N. The C1 Topology on the Space of Smooth Preference Profiles Social Choice and Welfare. 16: 445-470. DOI: 10.1007/S003550050155 |
0.316 |
|
1998 |
Schofield N, Sened I, Nixon D. Nash equilibrium in multiparty competitionwith “stochastic” voters Annals of Operations Research. 84: 3-27. DOI: 10.1023/A:1018997105830 |
0.486 |
|
1998 |
Schofield NJ, Martin AD, Quinn KM, Whitford AB. Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit Public Choice. 97: 257-293. DOI: 10.1023/A:1005025522565 |
0.382 |
|
1998 |
Schofield N. Aggregation of smooth preferences Social Choice and Welfare. 15: 161-185. DOI: 10.1007/S003550050098 |
0.304 |
|
1997 |
Schofield N. Political competition and multiparty coalition governments European Journal of Political Research. 31: 179-192. DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-6765.1993.Tb00346.X |
0.545 |
|
1995 |
Markose-Cherian S, Barnett WA, Hinich MJ, Schofield NJ. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. The Economic Journal. 105: 1677. DOI: 10.2307/2235140 |
0.337 |
|
1995 |
Schofield N. Coalition politics: A formal model and empirical analysis Journal of Theoretical Politics. 7: 245-281. DOI: 10.1177/0951692895007003002 |
0.537 |
|
1995 |
Schofield N. Rational choice and political economy Critical Review. 9: 189-211. DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443379 |
0.403 |
|
1989 |
Schofield N. Smooth social choice Mathematical and Computer Modelling. 12: 417-435. DOI: 10.1016/0895-7177(89)90414-7 |
0.306 |
|
1988 |
Schofield N, Grofman B, Feld SL. The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games American Political Science Review. 82: 195-211. DOI: 10.2307/1958065 |
0.412 |
|
1987 |
McKelvey RD, Schofield N. Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point Econometrica. 55: 923-933. DOI: 10.2307/1911036 |
0.348 |
|
1987 |
Schofield N. Stability of coalition governments in Western Europe: 1945-1986 European Journal of Political Economy. 3: 555-591. DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(87)90012-7 |
0.423 |
|
1986 |
Schofield N. Existence of a 'structurally stable' equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule Public Choice. 51: 267-284. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00128877 |
0.386 |
|
1985 |
Schofield N, Laver M. Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83 British Journal of Political Science. 15: 143-164. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400004130 |
0.337 |
|
1984 |
Schofield N. Crisis in economic relations between North and South Crisis in Economic Relations Between North and South. DOI: 10.2307/2620067 |
0.36 |
|
1984 |
Schofield N. Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold Mathematics of Operations Research. 9: 545-557. DOI: 10.1287/Moor.9.4.545 |
0.383 |
|
1984 |
Schofield N. Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets Journal of Economic Theory. 33: 59-71. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90040-1 |
0.398 |
|
1984 |
Schofield N. Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold Social Choice and Welfare. 1: 187-210. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00433516 |
0.347 |
|
1984 |
Schofield N. The general relevance of the impossibility teorem in smooth social choice Theory and Decision. 16: 21-44. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00141673 |
0.363 |
|
1983 |
Schofield N. Generic Instability of Majority Rule The Review of Economic Studies. 50: 695-705. DOI: 10.2307/2297770 |
0.328 |
|
1982 |
Schofield N. Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments Mathematical Social Sciences. 3: 9-32. DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8 |
0.365 |
|
1980 |
Schofield N. Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions Journal of Mathematical Economics. 7: 175-192. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(80)90006-3 |
0.372 |
|
1980 |
Schofield N. Formal political theory Quality and Quantity. 14: 249-275. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00154801 |
0.394 |
|
1980 |
Schofield N. The bargaining set in voting games Systems Research and Behavioral Science. 25: 120-129. DOI: 10.1002/Bs.3830250204 |
0.384 |
|
1978 |
Schofield N. The Political Economy Of Rational Entities Political Studies. 26: 138-147. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-9248.1978.Tb01529.X |
0.458 |
|
1977 |
Schofield N. The logic of catastrophe Human Ecology. 5: 261-271. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00891280 |
0.384 |
|
1976 |
Schofield N. The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions Public Choice. 26: 29-49. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01725791 |
0.373 |
|
1975 |
Schofield N. A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action Journal of Conflict Resolution. 19: 441-461. DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900303 |
0.369 |
|
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