| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2014 |
Satterthwaite MA, Williams SR, Zachariadis KE. Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions Games and Economic Behavior. 86: 248-263. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2014.03.014 |
0.551 |
|
| 2010 |
Besanko D, Doraszelski U, Kryukov Y, Satterthwaite M. Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics Econometrica. 78: 453-508. DOI: 10.3982/Ecta6994 |
0.35 |
|
| 2010 |
Besanko D, Doraszelski U, Lu LX, Satterthwaite M. Lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics Operations Research. 58: 1178-1193. DOI: 10.1287/Opre.1100.0823 |
0.406 |
|
| 2010 |
Doraszelski U, Satterthwaite M. Computable markov-perfect industry dynamics Rand Journal of Economics. 41: 215-243. DOI: 10.1111/J.1756-2171.2010.00097.X |
0.494 |
|
| 2010 |
Besanko D, Doraszelski U, Lu LX, Satterthwaite M. On the role of demand and strategic uncertainty in capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics International Journal of Industrial Organization. 28: 383-389. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ijindorg.2010.02.013 |
0.339 |
|
| 2008 |
Satterthwaite M, Shneyerov A. Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate Games and Economic Behavior. 63: 435-467. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2008.04.014 |
0.633 |
|
| 2007 |
Doraszelski U, Satterthwaite M. Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity Levine's Bibliography. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.965734 |
0.496 |
|
| 2007 |
Satterthwaite M, Shneyerov A. Dynamic matching, two-sided incomplete information, and participation costs: Existence and convergence to perfect competition Econometrica. 75: 155-200. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00735.X |
0.651 |
|
| 2003 |
Capps C, Dranove D, Satterthwaite M. Competition and market power in option demand markets. The Rand Journal of Economics. 34: 737-63. PMID 14992231 DOI: 10.2307/1593786 |
0.57 |
|
| 2003 |
Dranove D, Kessler D, McClellan M, Satterthwaite M. Is more information better? The effects of "Report Cards" on health care providers Journal of Political Economy. 111: 555-588. DOI: 10.1086/374180 |
0.318 |
|
| 2002 |
Satterthwaite MA, Williams SR. The optimality of a simple market mechanism Econometrica. 70: 1841-1863. |
0.585 |
|
| 2001 |
Capps CS, Dranove D, Greenstein SM, Satterthwaite M. The Silent Majority Fallacy of the Elzinga-Hogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W8216 |
0.51 |
|
| 2001 |
Satterthwaite MA. Strategy-proofness and markets Social Choice and Welfare. 18: 37-58. |
0.533 |
|
| 2000 |
Dranove D, Satterthwaite MA. Chapter 20 The industrial organization of health care markets Handbook of Health Economics. 1: 1093-1139. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80033-5 |
0.442 |
|
| 1989 |
Satterthwaite MA, Williams SR. The rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer’s bid double auction as the market becomes large Review of Economic Studies. 56: 477-498. DOI: 10.2307/2297496 |
0.602 |
|
| 1989 |
Gresik TA, Satterthwaite MA. The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms Journal of Economic Theory. 48: 304-332. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90128-2 |
0.608 |
|
| 1989 |
Satterthwaite MA, Williams SR. Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency Journal of Economic Theory. 48: 107-133. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-X |
0.338 |
|
| 1986 |
Dranove D, Satterthwaite M, Sindelar J. The effect of injecting price competition into the hospital market: The case of preferred provider organizations Inquiry. 23: 419-431. PMID 2947862 |
0.51 |
|
| 1985 |
Ravi Kumar K, Satterthwaite MA. Monopolistic competition, aggregation of competitive information, and the amount of product differentiation Journal of Economic Theory. 37: 32-54. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90029-8 |
0.448 |
|
| 1983 |
Myerson RB, Satterthwaite MA. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading Journal of Economic Theory. 29: 265-281. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 |
0.368 |
|
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