| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2017 |
Chen J, Fey M, Kristopher WR. A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design B E Journal of Theoretical Economics. 17: 1-10. DOI: 10.1515/Bejte-2015-0103 |
0.401 |
|
| 2015 |
Fey M, Jo J, Kenkel B. Information and International Institutions Revisited Journal of Conflict Resolution. 59: 149-160. DOI: 10.1177/0022002713503285 |
0.361 |
|
| 2013 |
Fey M, Meirowitz A, Ramsay KW. Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining Political Science Research and Methods. 1: 27-52. DOI: 10.1017/Psrm.2013.6 |
0.387 |
|
| 2012 |
Fey M, Clarke KA. Consistency of choice in nonparametric multiple comparisons Journal of Nonparametric Statistics. 24: 531-541. DOI: 10.1080/10485252.2012.675436 |
0.344 |
|
| 2012 |
Fey M. Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria Games and Economic Behavior. 75: 424-427. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2011.09.008 |
0.353 |
|
| 2012 |
Scott A, Fey M. The minimal covering set in large tournaments Social Choice and Welfare. 38: 1-9. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0503-4 |
0.308 |
|
| 2011 |
Fey M, Ramsay KW. Uncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining: Game-free analysis of international conflict American Journal of Political Science. 55: 149-169. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5907.2010.00486.X |
0.422 |
|
| 2010 |
Fey M, Ramsay KW. When is shuttle diplomacy worth the commute?: Information sharing through mediation World Politics. 62: 529-560. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887110000183 |
0.334 |
|
| 2009 |
Goemans HE, Fey M. Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble The Journal of Politics. 71: 35-54. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608090038 |
0.389 |
|
| 2009 |
Fey M, Ramsay KW. Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types Review of Economic Design. 13: 233-250. DOI: 10.1007/S10058-008-0055-6 |
0.374 |
|
| 2008 |
Fey M. Choosing from a large tournament Social Choice and Welfare. 31: 301-309. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0279-3 |
0.343 |
|
| 2007 |
Fey M, Ramsay KW. Mutual optimism and war American Journal of Political Science. 51: 738-754. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5907.2007.00278.X |
0.336 |
|
| 2007 |
Kim J, Fey M. The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences Journal of Economic Theory. 135: 236-252. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2006.04.001 |
0.368 |
|
| 2006 |
Fey M, Ramsay KW. The common priors assumption: A comment on "bargaining and the nature of war", Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50: 607-613. DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289182 |
0.38 |
|
| 2006 |
Duggan J, Fey M. Repeated Downsian electoral competition International Journal of Game Theory. 35: 39-69. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0046-1 |
0.605 |
|
| 2005 |
Duggan J, Fey M. Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates Games and Economic Behavior. 51: 490-522. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2004.11.006 |
0.584 |
|
| 2004 |
Fey M. May’s Theorem with an infinite population Social Choice and Welfare. 23: 275-293. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-003-0264-4 |
0.354 |
|
| 2003 |
Fey M. A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules Social Choice and Welfare. 20: 27-32. DOI: 10.1007/S003550200157 |
0.353 |
|
| 2002 |
Fey M, Kim J. The Swing Voter's Curse: Comment The American Economic Review. 92: 1264-1268. DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344803 |
0.342 |
|
| 1997 |
Fey M. Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting American Political Science Review. 91: 135-147. DOI: 10.2307/2952264 |
0.423 |
|
| 1996 |
Fey M, McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR. An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games 1 International Journal of Game Theory. 25: 269-287. DOI: 10.1007/Bf02425258 |
0.549 |
|
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